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CHAP!'ER I 
INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
At the core of human communication transactions is the 
structuring and interpreting of impinging environmental stimuli. The 
observation of self and others yields bits and pieces of information, 
that are put together to form a meaningful, albeit tentative, 
impression of behavior. The pivotal nexus in this process of "meaning 
creation" is the inference persons make about the causes of observed 
behavior, Attribution -- the behavior of the average individual in 
attempting to infer the underlying ca.uses of observed behavior -- ma.y 
' 
be the incipient phase of human communication. 
Understanding the dynamics that intervene between information 
) 
and meaning is a relevant and significant concern of' the communication 
theorist for two reasons. First, understanding how individuals go 
about attributing the ca.uses of behavior ay fur~er illuminate the 
dynamics of huan information processing. Second, once a cause for an 
action has been tentatively designated, the nature of future communica-
tion may be channelized in predisposed, systematic manners, 
The authors of a recent survey of attribution theory and 
research [Jones, Xanouse, Kelle7, Nisbett, Valina & Weiner, 1971, P• 




(1) '!be factors motivating the individual to obtain 
causally relevant information, 
(2) the factors detemining what cause will be 
assi~ed for a given event, and 
D) the consequences of :making one causal 
attribution rather than another. 
The nature of the first concern is integral to unders~ding the link 
between communication and attribution. 
A primary motive of man is to engage in effective interaction 
with the environment. The constituents of such effectiveness a.re 
understanding, prediction and control, Arriving at a subjectively 
satisfying interpretation of the environment, man makes it predictable 
and, thus, feels competent to exercise control over it. Seeking out 
and defining the underlying causes of observed behavior initiates the 
l 
first step in achieving effective interaction with the environment. 
Harold Kell~y [1971a, p. 22] proposed that the attribution pr~cess be 
' 
seen as an individual's 
means of encouraging and maintaining his effective exercise 
of control in the world. The purpose of causal analysis --
the function it serves for the species and the individual --
is effective control. The attributor is not simply an attri-
butor, a seeker after knowledge. His latent goal in gaining 
knowledge is that of effective management of himself and his 
environment. He is not a. pure "scientist," then, but an 
applied one. 
Having been J110tivated to make causal a.t,tributions, what naturally 
follows is the comparison of the predicted with the perceived and, 
subsequently, the determination of needed adjustments. Various other 
motives can be derived from this superordinate one, but it is important 
to note that the impetus for human communication may also appropriately 
be ascribed to the need "to act effectively" [Ba.rnlund, 1962]. 
The second concern is clearly reflected in the focus of scien-
J 
tific investigations of the attribution phenome1'0n -- the discovery and 
verification of any systematic consistencies in how individuals search 
I 
for and process available environmental information relevant to ca.usa.l 
a.na.lysis. In attempting to delineate the factors that may systemati-
cally determi~e what ca.use will be assigned for a given event, attri-
bution research has produced a.' variety of pa.radigms intended to illumi-
nate the manner in which persons will assign ca.uses for events a.nd 
behavior. One of the more pervasive paradigms recently proposed is 
the "actor-observer" phenomenon [Jones & Nisbett, 1971]. Extracting 
from Reider's [19.58] lb,t Psychology .Q.i: Interpersonal Relations, Jones 
and Nisbett [1971, p. 80] argued that 
there is a pervasive tendency for actors to attribute 
their actions to situational requirements, whereas) 
observers tend to attribute the same actions to stable 
personal dispositions. 
'!his phenomenon may be explained in terms of information available. 
The a.ctor has more readily avail.a.ble information concerning the situa-, 
tion, its history and growth, and the constraints imposed upon behavior 
by environmental forces. On the other hand, the observer does not have 
ready access to ~is information, To the observer the behavior is 
figural, while the context is the ground, For the a.ctor, however, the 
I 
behavior is the ground while the context is figura.l. 'l'h.usp Jones and 
Nisbett [1971, P• 85] asserted tha.t 
different aspects of the a.vaila.ble information a.re salient 
for actors and observers a.nd 1this differential salience 
affects the course a.nd outcome of the attribution process, 
While the actor's view of his own behavior emphasiBes the role of 
environmental conditions a.t the moment of action, the observer's empha-
4 
sis is upon the causal role of stable dispositions and personal proper-
ties of the actor, In terms of an internal-external attributional 
dichotomy, the paradigm predicts that observers will designate primar-
ily internal causes, while actors will designate primarily external 
causes. In short, as Kelley [1971a, p. 18] put it, "Too little account 
is taken of external causes (contextual factors) in judgments of other 
persons' behavior." 
While much research has been conducted as to how actors construe 
their own behavior, the construction processes of observers is equally 
important. Ichheiser [1970] has presented a variety of phenomenological 
examples that demonstrate that many complex and:often coercive social 
arrangements derive from society-as-observer attributions. An appro-
priate focus for research would then tend to concentrate on the observer 
in this paradigm. 
While there may be relatively,sta.ble systems associated with the 
causal attributions of observers, there may be differences in how 
observers process information related to other factors. For example, 
under what conditions will an observer !121 make predominantly internal 
attributions concerning an actor's behavior. Two mitigating factors 
that may exert significant influence are involvement and strain towards 
balance. 
I 
Differences 1n observers' causa.l attributions about an actor's 
behavior may be related to the degree that observers are involved with 
the actor. Jones and Nisbett [1971] asserted that the observer's 
tendency to attribute action to the actor would probably increase as he 
became more actively involved with the actor -- when the consequences 
s 
of the actor's behavior affect the observer, his goals, etc., and when 
the observer may infiuence the actor as well a.s be influenced by him. 
However, Kelley [1971a., P• 19] suggested that 
those actions of another person that are in conflict with 
the attributor's interests tend to be attributed, more than 
they should be, to that person. 
In interdependent interaction with another person, the 
attributor tends to attribute to hiJnself those actions of 
the other person that a.re consistent with the attributor•s 
own interests. 
Thus, the observer's involvement with the actor would be expected to 
affect the na.ture of the observer's attribution -- external when the 
action is positive and internal when the action is negative. 
In a like manner the congruity or incongruity of the actor's 
behavior with the sentiment relations between actor and observer as 
seen by the observer may also infiuence the nature of observers' causal 
ascriptions. Ba.lance was proposed by Fritz Heider [19.58] a.s an operat-
ing principle which works in conjunction with other principles to 
influence the organ121ed cognitive and perceptual processes of an 
individual. 
The concept of a bala.nced state designates a situation in 
which the perceived units and the experienced sent1ments 
co-exist without stress a there is thus no pressure towards 
change, either in the cognitive orga.n1B&tion or 1n the 
sentiment. [Heider, 19.58, P• 176] , 
In a more general sense, balance refers to a "fit without stress." 
Heider maintained that balance 1s preferred and, in the ca.se of 
imbalance, the configuration wlll change 1n the direction of balance 
-- a satisfying fitting together of social elements. 
Historically it 1s appropriate to join balance and attribution 
in that it was Heider [19.58, p, 56] who first proposed that 
6 
behavior can be ascribed primarily to the person or to the 
envirOlllllent; that is, behavior can be accounted for by 
relatively stable traits of the personality or by factors 
within the environment, 
For example, the acquisition and maintenance of a balanced configura-
tion would suggest that an observer makes primarily external causal 
attributions when presented with an actor he likes behaving in a way 
he dislikes, rather than the internal attribution predicted by the 
actor-observer paradigm. Thus, a. balanced state may serve as a. 
criterion of attributional sufficiency. Ba.lance is not merely one 
vehicle by which attributions are made, but rather a criterion for 
understanding, a criterion for when explanations for behavior are 
thought to be sufficient. 
However, people may differ in their need to acquire and main-
tain balanced cognitive configurations. Some people, in fact, seem 
to be intrigued with imbalanced patterns, finding them exciting and 
growthful. These differences may lead to considerable differences 
in the nature of causal attributions. This difference in preference 
for balance may reflect differences in level of cognitive functioning, 
One significant indicator of level of cognitive functioning is cogni-
tive complexity [Crockett, 1965], This personality characteristic 
indexes the differentiation and hierarchic organization of a person's 
cognitive system and has been shown to be a factor in an individual's 
preference for balance. The cognitively complex person differentiates 
more precisely the qualities of others, recognizes and accepts the 
co-existence of positive and negative traits in the sa.me person, and 
organizes his impression of beha.vior so as to account for both positive 
and negative traits [Crockett, 1965; Mayo & Crockett, 1964; Rosenkra.ntz 
7 
& Crockett, 1965; Meltzer, Crockett & Rosenkra.ntz, 1966; Nidorf & 
Crockett, 1965; Nidorf, 196+; Ma.hood, 1971]. Thus, the tendency 
towards balance, which may require the supression-in one way or 
another of incongruent elements by relatively noncomplex perceivers, 
ma.y be a less compelling motive for the more cognitively complex 
person. That is, the individual who is more likely to recognize, 
accept, and explain in an organized manner the incongruent elements 
of a person's behavior ma.y be less likely to make causal attributions 
that are primarily the result of a strong preference for balanced 
cognitive configumtions. 
Thus, three variables expected to be related to the formation of 
causal attributions are the congruity of an actor's behavior with the 
sentiment relation between actor and observer, the degree of inter-
dependent involvement between actor and observer, a.nd the cognitive 
complexity of the observer. This study determines the ef'fect of these 
three variable~, singly and in combination, upon the causal attributions 
of observers. Varying the degree of' lilting that observers have for an 
actor and varying the desirability of the actor's behavior should yield 
\ 
information a.bout the effect of preference for balance upon the nature 
of ca.usa.l attributions. Varying the degree of observers' interdepen-
dence with an actor should yield information about the effect of 
differential involvement on the formation of causal attributions. 
Measuring observers' co~tive complexity should yield information 
about the effect of differential levels of cognitive functioning upon 
~e complexity of attributional functioning. In addition, varying these 
factors should facilitate the exploration of the consequences of ma.king 
/ 
8 
one ca.usa.l attribution rather than another, specificaJ.ly in regards to 
the nature of interpersonal communication between actor and observers. 
Review of the Literature 
Ca.usa.l Attributions !!l!! Actors Observers 
A few studies have provided direct support for Jones and 
Nisbett's [1971, P• 93] proposition that 
Actors tend,to attribute the ca.use of their behavior 
to' stimuli inherent in the situation, while observers tend 
to attribute behavior to stable dispositions of the actor. 
Several studies have asked subjects to record the ca.uses of' behavior 
' 
presented in written form. McArthur [1970; 1972] showed subjects simple 
one sentence descriptions of a.n a.ction and then asked them to indicate 
whether the action occurred as a result of the person, the stimulus, 
\ 
or the situation. The source cited most frequently was the person. 
Attributions of person-stimulus interaction were cited most often when 
the description involved emotiona.J:rea.ctions and experiences (i.e., 
X likes the tv show, ) • 
Two studies reported by Nisbett, Ca.puto, Legant and Ma.recek 
[1973] lend additional support. In the first study ,subjects were 
requested to indicate why they liked the female they had dated most 
frequently recently, why they had chosen their college major, why their 
best friend liked the girl he had dated most frequently recently, and 
why their best friend had chosen his college major, In explaining 
their own choice of female comp,m.ons, subjects cited twice as many 
stimulus reasons as personal dispositions, while reporting equal, 
numbers of stimulus and dispositional reasons for their best friends. 
On the other hand, their friend's choice of college major reflected 
9 
four times as many dispositional reasons compared to reasons associated 
with the nature of the major, while equal numbers of entity and dispo-
sitional reasons were reported in explaining their own choice. 
In the second experiment subjects checked which of three 
descriptions best described several stimulus perso~s, including them-
selves: a trait term, its polar opposite, or the phrase Hit depends 
on the situation." Subjects attributed fewer trait 1 terms to themselves 
than to other people, and fewer trait terms for those they knew well 
than for those they knew less well. 
A series of studies conducted by Taylor and Koivuma.k11 found 
moderate confirming support using the sa.me written recall format. 
People viewed their own behavior as more situationally determined than 
that of other people. They also found a. positivity effect 1n that 
person attributions were ma.de for positive behaviors, while situational 
attributions were ma.de for negative behaviors. It is interesting to 
note that in the one study which employed :ratings on both situational 
and dispositional scales, rather than ratings on a scale that placed 
situational causes at one end and dispositional causes at the other, 
as acquaintance with the other person increased dispositional factors 
were judged to be more important than situational factors in producing 
positive behaviors. This suggests that persons operate much more 
complexly than research instruments allow. That is, rather than sliding 
ba.ck and forth on an interna.1-externa.l scale, the subject probably 
construes behavior causally on a. multi-dimensional matrix composed of 
a variety of causal loci, As information is acquired and processed, 
different vectors come into play and interact to infiuence the attri-
10 
bution process. The more measures of attribution allow for the 
reporting of such complexity, the more the underlying dynamics of 
causal attributions will be revealed. 
As one moves to the observation of actual on-going behavior, 
the results do not change drastically. Nisbett, Caputo, Lega.nt and 
Marecek [19?3] asked actor-subjects and observer-subjects to estimate 
the probability that an actor would volunteer for a task ~s a function 
of whether or not actors had volunteered for a similar prior task. 
Observers inferred that the person would volunteer or not according to 
whether he had volunteered or failed to do so on the earlier trail, 
Actors, themselves, did not tie their predicted future behavior so 
unequivocally to their pa.st actions, 
McArthur [1970; 1972] solicited subjects' participation in a 
survey of interpersonal relationships and then asked them why they had 
agreed to participate, Subjects attributed their actions to such 
factors a~ the imports.nee of the survey. Observers, who were given a 
written account of the actors• behavior and the circumstances of the 
action, explained the same behavior primarily as personal inclinations 
to participate in such surveys. 
Storms [197J] investigated the effects of changes in visual 
orientation upon the attributions of actors and observers. He reported 
strong evidence that actors cha.racteristically attribute causality to 
aspects of the situation, while observers tend to attribute causality 
to the actor's disposition, 
There is indirect evidence that generally supports the existence 
of differential attributions made by actors about themselves, and 
11 
observers about actors [Jones, Rock, Shaver, Goethals and Ward, 1968; 
Jones and Harris, 1967; Jones, Worchel, Goethals and Grumet, 1971]. 
While not directly concerned with causal attributions, these studies 
found in a variety of situations a general tendency for observers to 
place greater emphasis than did actors themselves upon dispositional 
factors in explaining an actor's behavior. Studies by Jones and Harris 
[1967] and Jones, Worobel, Goethals and Grumet [1971] are especially 
compelling. In both studies subjects read or listened to speeches 
presumably written by fellow students. Subjects were asked to esti-
mate the communicator's real opinions based on this informat1onci In 
a "no choice" condition subjects were convinced that the communicators 
had_no freedom in their choice of sides on that particular topic. In 
spite of evidence that circumstances strongly affected the delivered 
message, subjects' estimates of the co•unicators' real positions 
were unduly influenced by the message presented. 
An explanation of the underlying dynamics of this phenomenon 
may begin by recalling the earlier discussion of the motive of effectance 
-- the processing of environmental information to achieve effective 
interaction with that environment. Assigning a cause to a particular 
event or behavior makes that behavior understandable, predictable and, 
thus, potentially controllable. Within this framework, actors and 
observers attempt to explain the causes of an actor's behavior. The 
differential treatm.ent of the same action by actors and observers can 
be partially ascribed to differences 1n the info:cma.tion th&t each 
possess about the behavior [Jones & Nisbett, 1971]. However, this same 
orientation may also explain differences 1n how both process salient 
r 
12 
information. Bem [196?] has asserted that a.ctors and observers use 
similar evidence and logic in construing the actor's behavior, a.ctors 
being self-observers. However, the actor may pla.ce greater emphasis 
upon situational elements in explaining his own behavior not only 
' 
because he has ready access to that data, but also because the ability 
to respond differentially to varying situations enhances his sense of 
control of the environment [Mischel, 1969]. On the other hand, the 
I 
observer likewise enhances his sense of control by attributing rel.a.-, 
ti vely , stable ca.usa.l dispositions to the actor, making the actor 
potentially more predictable [Brehm, 1966]. This line of reasoning 
might also account for the positivity effects noted in,some studies 
such that the attribution of negative acts to circumstantial factors 
increases the probability, or sensed probability, tha.t non-attmctive 
I 
consequences may be manipulated, controlled., predicted and, thus, 
prevented; or, at least, that the perceiver is not subject to the 
behavior of a malevolent actor. 
While the evidence for the actor-observer hypothesis is certainly 
not incontrovertible, there would appear to be sufficient consi~tency 
in experimental results to merit tentative acceptance. It is also 
1 clear that the effect of other cognitive and motivational processes 
I 
upon the differential beha.vior of actors and observers has not been 
thoroughly researched. As with Storms's [197.3] study of the effects 
of visual and physical perspective upon attributional tendencies, the 
effects of these variables 1;1pon attributions should be subjected to 
further empirical investigation. In this regam., the further refine-
men~ of attribution mea.s~s so as to differentiate plausible causa.l 
13 
loci would provide further information about the underlying dynamics 
involved in determining the direction that attributions take. Such 
elaboration has already advanced the knowledge of success-failure 
attributions [Weiner, Frieze, Kukla., Reed, Rest & Rosenbaum, 1971], 
and should be undertaken in future actor-observer research. 
' Involvement y,a Ce.usa.l Attributions 
The effect upon causal attributions of different levels of 
observer interdependence with the actor has not be,en extensively studied, 
' 
The theoretical hypotheses tha.t have been advanced must be subjected 
to further empirical testing before they can be tentatively accepted 
or rejected, 
Jones and Nisbett [1971] distinguished ~tween passive and active 
observers on the basis of influence and reciprocality. The passive 
I 
observer is typically neither affected by the actor's behavior nor in 
a position to respond to the actor. The active observer, however, 
is typically both affected by the actor's behavior and in a situation 
to influence and respond to the actor. From the results of studies 
reviewed above, one would expect the passive observer to make predomi-
nantly dispositional attributions for the actor's behavior, especially 
when it is positive. The question at hand is how does being actively 
I 
involve~ with an actor affect the observer's causal attributions. 
Jones and Nisbett [1971] predicted that the active observer 
will behave in ways similar to the passive observer; that is that he 
will make primarily internal, dispositional attributions. They ~vanced 
three theoretical reasons to support this point, First, the active 
observer is, in some senses, now an actor himself and, being caught 
14 
up in on-going action, may be less likely to make appraisals of 
environmental constraints than he normally would. Second, since the 
I 
active observer may be in a position where prediction of the actor's 
behavior is highly salient, he would be especially concerned to deter-
mine the actor's dispositions. Third, if the surrounding environment 
is basically the same for actor and ·observer, the? the extent to 
which the actor responds differently from the observer should cause 
the observer to make essentially dispositional attributions 1about the 
actor. In short, all these factors would induce the active observer 
to make dispositional causal attributions. 
On the other hand, Kelley [1971a] has suggested that in inter-
dependent interaction with another person; the attributor will tend 
to attribute to himself those actions of the other person that are 
consistent with the attributor's own interests, goals, values, etc.; 
while attributing to the other person those actions of the other 
person that are inconsistent with the attributer's goa.ls. Kelley' 
offered some empirical research that gives limited support for his 
thesis. Johnson, Feigenbaum and Welby [1964] reported on teachers 0 
attributions of students who improved over time and students'who 
continued to do poorly. The increase in performance was attributed 
by the teachers to their own effectiveness, while the continued poor 
performance was attributed by the teachers to the students' lack of 
ability or effort. In a replication of this study, Beckman [1970] 
reported the same kind of attributions for teachers, but not for 
uninvolved observers. This same attributional tendency for teachers 
has also been reported elsewhere [Streufert & Streufert, 1969], 
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On the, surface both positions appear sensible, although incon-
gruent. The former hypothesis asserts that d1sposit1o.nal attribu-
tions will be the result of a decreased attention to environmental 
factors consequent upon increased interdependence. Kelley seems to 
be saying that people prefer to take responsibility for positive conse-
quences a.nd reject the responsibility for negative consequences. We 
prefer a modification of Kelley's position, principally because of 
empirical evidence, but also because it makes intuitive and pheno-
menological sense. A brief examination of the underlying dynamics 
of active involvement will cla.rify the choice. 
In 1961 Jones and Davis proposed "hedonic relevance" as a 
factor significantly inf'luencing causal attributions. An act has 
hedonic relevance 1n so far as it promotes or undermines an attributor's 
interests, goals, etc. -- proves gratifying or disappointing. An a.~t 
that facilitates goal attainment, task accomplishment, or reinforces 
values would be of positive hedonic relevance am, according to Kelley, 
would be attributed to one's self rather than to the source of the act. 
I 
But an actor's behavior also has hed.onic relevance for a different 
reason. The extent to which a person beha.ves as one predicts 1s rele-
vant to one's sense of understanding, prediction and control. In this 
regard, it is probably a d1st1ngu1Bh1ng chamcter1st1c of the active 
observer that he has infomation, gathered through inte:mction, about 
the actor's orientation towams him. Such intonation often leads to 
predictions about the actor's behavior 1n reference to the observer. 
There are now actually two ways 1n which another's behavior can possess 
' ' 
positive or negative hedon1c relevance -- llbether the actor behaved as 
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predicted and whether the act was facilitative or destructive of the 
observer's goals, desires, etc. 
This is a complex situation where the sources of hedonic rele-
vance may in fact compete with each other. In these situations it 
may be that the behavior with direct implications for one's predictive 
capability will establish the primary attributional direction. There 
a.re thus four possible outcomes depending upon whether the behavior is 
positive or negative and whether it is expected or unexpected. 
Where positive behavior is expected and ~bserved, both acts 
would be of positive hedonic relevance. The relevance to general pre-
dictive accuracy would indicate a. dispositional attribution to the 
actor, but, at the same time, the positive behavior, in keeping with 
Kelley's argument, would indicate an attribution to self as well. 
Where positive behavior is observed and unexpected, one act is 
of positive hedonic relevance, and one is of negative relevance. In 
this situation, attributions to circumstances would maintain one's 
predictive ability by ascribing the unexpected behavior to mutable 
and often unpredictable aspects of the environme.nt. 
Where negative behavior is expected and observed» one could 
expect dispositional attributions to the actor consistent with the 
hedonic relevance to predictive ability and Kelley's speculation about 
explanations for negative acts. 
Where negative is observed and unexpected, circumstantial attri-
butions to mutable aspects of the situation would be expected in light 
of the implications for predictive ability. In fact, where ~creased 
positive acquaintance leads to stronger positive expectations, the 
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tendency to attribute unexpected negative behavior to circumstantial 
sources appears to increase [Taylor & Koivuma.ki1J. 
Prec~sely what direction causal attributions will take in ea.ch 
of these condit±ons is not completely clear and needs further research. 
But it is reasonable to expect that differentia.l levels of interde-
pendent involvement will infiuence the nature of observers' attributions. 
Ba.la.nee !SS, Attributions 
A number of theorists have presented the idea. that persons tend 
to organize perceptual data in cognitively consistent patterns (Abelson, 
Aronson, McGuire, Newcomb, Rosenberg & ~enba.um, 1968], One of the 
more potent and applicable statements of such tendencies is Heider's 
principle of be.la.nee [19.58, p, 180], 
By a balanced state (or situation) is meant a harmonious 
state, one 1n which the entities comprising the situation 
and the feelings a.bout them fit together without stress. 
I 
' The elements of ba.la.nce are perceived sentiment and unit formations. 
A ba.J.anced state is one 1n which the perceived sentiments and perceived 
J 
I units co-exist without stress. In one way or another they tend to fit 
together. The typical statement of the Heiderian formulation involves 
' 
a P-0-X triad: P likes O, P likes X, P perceives O in unit relation-
ship to X. Sentiment relations can possess either a positive 1(like) 
or a negative (not like) sign, as can unit (positive) and not unit 
(negative) relations. The simplest statement of the principle is that 
a balanced configuration exists when the algebraic product of the 
I 
I 
signs of the three relations is positive, and imba.la.nced when negative. 
Many excellent reviews of theory and research related to balance have 
appeared in recent yea.rs [Abelson, .!1 !:J:., 1968; Rosenberg & Abelson, 
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1960] that sketch the growth and development of the theory. 
Though subject to some interpretation regarding underlying 
dynamics, there is a wealth of research evidence supporting most of 
Heider's original formulations: individuals appear to exhibit a 
preference for balanced configura.tions [Jordan, 1953; Price, Harburg 
&·McLeod, 1965; Price, Harburg & Newcomb, 1966; Rodrigues, 1965, 1967]; 
individuals appear to change imbalanced structures into balanced 
structures [Burnstein, 1967; Rodrigues, 1967]; individuals appear to 
remember balanced structures better than imbalanced ones [Featherp 
1969a, 1970]. But while these results tend to generally support the , 
importance of the balance principle in the structuring of perceived 
social relations, there has not been much investigation of the effects 
of a·strain towards balance upon the processes of causal attributions. 
Harold Kelley's discussion of causal schema.ta. [1971b, 1973] provides an 
appropriate context for such an application, 
Consistent with his assertion of systematic proclivities in the 
I 
attribution process, Kelley suggested that attributors are prone to use 
I:, 
a variety of attributional schemas in designating the underlying cause 
I 
of an event or behavior, One such schema. is balance. Consider the 
situation where P likes O, and O perfo:z:ms an act, X, that P dislikes. 
Central to this1analysis is whether or not P perceives a unit relation 
between O and X. In attributional tams a unit relation reflects P0s 
assumption that O caused x. The formation of a not unit relation 
refiects P's assumption that O did not really cause x. In other words~ 
does P make primarily dispositional or primarily situational attribu-
tions about the causes of O's behavior? Ba.lance predictions would 
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suggest that when O's behavior is consist-eni---(possesses the same sign) 
with P's perceived sentiment toward o, then P will make dispositional 
attributions (form a unit relation between O and X). 
/p' 
likes/(+) l~s (+) 
0-unit-X 
(+) 
P likes o. 
P likes X. 




P dislikes O, 
P dislikes x. 
0 ca.uses x. 
In both situations above, P would make internal, dispositional attri-
butions about the ca.uses of O's behavior since such attributions appro-
priate a balanced configuration (the algebraic product of the signs is 
positive). Such analysis is from P's viewpoint, as is the analysis of 
an observer's attributions. 





P dislikes O. 
P likes X. 
/p'-.' 
likes'+) dislikes(-) rf\_, 'x 
P likes o. 
P dislikes Xci 
It 1s clear that in these situations 9 P basically ha.s three choiceso 
First, he can a.scribe the cause of X to someone or something other tha.n 
0 -- the circumstances. Second, he can change his sentiment toward O 
and ascribe th~ ca.use of X to dispositional qualities of Oa Or, third, 
he can change his valence towards X and make similar dispositional attri-
butions. If',,however, the experienced sentiment is salient and strong 
enough, 1 t my realistically ·be predicted that P will make primarily 
situational attributions by the formation of not unit relations between 
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O and x. If this analysis were applied to observers in the manner just 
outlined, the underlying dynamics of the actor-observer pa.:r:a.digm can 
be el.a.borated. 
Jones and Nisbett [1973, p. 93] sa.w the plausibility of such 
predictions in their discussion of the influence of motivational and 
cognitive factors upon the attributional tendencies of observers. 
We also rea.dily grant that, when the observer has a. favorable 
opinion of the actor who performs a. praiseworthy a.ct, a 
dispositional inference is more likely ••• The tendency to 
infer dispositional ca.uses is undoubtedly also enhanced when 
the observer dislikes the actor who performs a blameworthy 
act •••• the observer's bia.s can just as easily be 
reversed, as when the observer likes the perpetrator of bad 
acts ••• or dislikes the performer of good acts, 
In terms of ca.usa.1 schemas, Kelley suggested that ba.J.a.nce is a. '°simple 11 , 
"main effect" pattern that reflects either persons or entity attribu-
tions. Citing the research of Cha.pma.n a.nd Chapman [1967, 1969] and 
Jones and Harris [1967], Kelley asserted that there would appear to 
be a tendency for attribu.tors to prefer simple mther than complex 
causal schemas "even under circumsta.nces where the use of such schemata. 
is in conflict with other evidence in the situation" [197.'.3, P• 122]. 
There is ava.ila.ble research evidence to indicate tha.t such might 
generally be the case, 
Feather [1969b] reported indirect evidence supporting the 
, 
geneml balance contention. He reported that subjects who were ini-
tially confident of passing a. test tended to attribute success to inter-
nal factors while attributing failure to external, situational factors. 
This effect wa.s replicated in later research [Feather&: Simon, 1971a] 
and also reported in reference to observer's attributions of actors• 
success [Feather&: Simon, 1971b]. If expectations can be interpreted 
I 
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as "I expect people I like to do likeable things," then the results 
bear directly upon a balance schema. Press and Bethel [1971] reported 
more direct evidence. Presenting subjects with an actor and his 
behavior, they reported that balanced situations produced the attribu-
tion of internal, disposition motives, and unbalanced situations the 
attribution of external or devious motives in explaining O's actions. 
Data analyzed, but npt reported, by Taylor and Koivwna.k:11 also lend 
support to the existence of balance effects 1n observersa attributionsa 
They asked married couples who was responsible for arguments in their 
family: themselves, their spouses, or situational factors. Subj~cts 
reported primarily situational factors (only three of forty-six cited 
their spouses, while twelve cited themselves). This sugge,sts, in 
balance terms, that if subjects liked their spouses, and disliked 
arguments, then the acquisition of a 'balanced configuration was appro-
priated by circumstantial attributions (P likes o, P dislikes X, 0 
not unit, with X), Press2 has gathered data that confirms the effects 
of balance preferences upon attributional tendencies, such that 
personality is referred to more often than circumstances in explaining 
the positive behavior of a lilted peer and the negative behavior of a 
disliked peer. On the other hand, circumstances are referred to more 
than personality when subjects explain the negative behavior of a 
liked peer and the positive behavior of a disliked peer. 
While research in this pa.rticula.r area. has not been extensive, 
enough evidence is present to suggest that ba.lance does affect causal 
attributions and it is consistent enough to merit further investigation. 
Ba.lance can either be considered as a simple causal schema., a. la Kelley, 
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or as a criterion of attributional sufficiency. Future research should 
examine the latter position as it allows for the introduction and 
consideration of additional cognitive, motivational and causal schemas 
co-existent with balancing tendencies. As attribution appears to.be a 
complex phenomenon, this position makes more theoretical and pra.ct;cal 
sense. 
Cognitive Complexity 
Recognizing that individuals differ in the manners in which they 
cognitively deal with social percepts, several theorists have focused 
attention on cognitive complexity [Bieri, 1955; Leventhal, 1957; Scott, 
1962, 196); Zajonc, 1960; Crockett, 1965; Vannoy, 1965]. Each author 
has developed somewhat different definitions and measurements of cogn+-
tive complexity. Since Crockett's approach is analytic rather than 
phenomenological [Zajonc, 1960], its techniques and conclusions are 
more applicable to a discussion of be.lance (tl:le analytic method derives 
from how individuals reconcile inconsistencies). Additionally, the 
approach is easy to administer and has appropriated an attractive body 
of theory as underpinnings. Thus, this approach (Crockettws) is pre-
ferred for the present investigation. 
In explaining the relationship between cognitive complexity and 
impression formation, Crockett [1965] has synthesized the theoretical 
positions of George;Kelly [1955] and Heinz Werner [1957, 1961]. Crockett 
has approached complexity from a developmental perspective emphasizing 
, 
the differentiation and organization of individual construct systems. 
A brief examination of Kelly's &nd Werner's theories will elaborate the 
perspective chosen here. 
At the ba.se of Kelly's theory of personality is his belief tha.t 
a primary motive of man is prediction and control. He advised that a.11 
men should be seen as scientists whose "ultiJnate aim is to predict and 
control" [19.5.5, p • .5]. This is an essentia.l.ly gestaltist position that 
stresses the transaction between man and the environment in the crea-
tion of meaning. Ma.n is simply not a passive responder to environmental 
, 
stimuli, but rather an active creator of his own reality. Ma.n repre-
sents, construes the environment rather tha.n just responding to it. By 
placing varying constructions on his environment, man imposes patterns 
on the world by which he interprets (creates) reality. By ma.king pre-
' 
dictive inferences about his environment, man can respond.with appro-
priate behavior, and, thus, exert control over his world, 
Kelly intuitively asserted that ma.n's construct systems develope 
out of experience w1 th social interaction. And though construct sys-
tems may differ, there a.re similarities between individuals that allow 
for and can facilitate social interaction (This interaction hypothesis 
is similar to Mead's significant symbol theory and has been explored by 
Adams-Webber [1969], although not 1n Meadian terms.), However, Kelly 
does not speculate as to the exact nature of a construct s~stemvs 
development. Crockett used Werner's orthogenetic principle of growth 
to specify the line of constructural development. The orthogenetic 
principle, as stated by Werner, is that 
l 
Wherever development occurs it proceeds from a state 
of relative globality am lack of differentiation to 
a state of increasing differentiation and hierarchic 
integration. [19.57, p. 127] 
Combining Kelly and Wemer, Crockett def'ined cognitive complexityo 
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A cognitive system will be considered relatively complex 
in structure when a) it contains a relatively large number 
of elements and b) the elements are integrated hierarchicall~ 
by relatively extensive bonds of relationship. [1965, p. 49J 
Thus, differentiation and hierarchic organization are the criteria of 
cognitive complexity. Differentiation refers to the number of con-
structs, while organization refers to relationships between these con-
structs. An index of complexity is the degree of differentiation an 
individual uses in construing reality and his ability to unite the 
elements of his construction into an intenelated system. Several 
studies have indicated that construct systems do develope in line with 
the orthogenetic principle [Dombush, Ha.stdorf, Richardson, Muzzy & 
Vreeland, 1965: Signell, 1966; Scarlett, Press & Crockett, 1971]. 
While there are several studies indexing the relationship 
b~twe~n cognitive complexi~y and other variables [see Crockett, 1965, 
and Abelson et~. 1968], the focus of the present analysis is upon 
the effects of cognitive complexity on the strain towards ba.lanceu 
There is a substantial amount of research that baa.rs directly upon 
the relation between complexity and ba.lanceo 
It would appear that subjects low in cognitive complexity tend 
to rely on the balance formulation in dealing with social reality 
[Press, Crockett & Rosenkrantz, 1969; Delia., 19701 Delia & Crockett, 
1973; Shaw, 1969; Scott, 1962, 196J] more than subjects opera.ting at 
a high level of cognitive complexity. Explanations for this rest upon 
the tendency of the high complexity individual to, first, recognize the 
existence of both positive and negative information and, second, inte-
grate that information into their impression. Rather than supressing 
or distorting inconsistent information, high complexity individuals 
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will report impressions that tend to be bi-va.lent and account for the 
existence of both positive and negative traits [Crockett, 1965, in 
reanalyzing Supnick's da.ta, 1964; Ma.yo & Crockett, 1964r Rosenkra.ntz 
& Crockett, 1965; Meltzer, Crockett & Rosenkra.ntz, 1966; Nidorf & 
Crockett, 1965; Nidorf, 1961; Ma.boo~, 1971]. 
Individuals who possess a highly differentiated construct system 
simply have more dimensions by which to construe elements of their 
perceptual field and, thus, a.re more likely to recognize disparate 
elements, As the organisation of their system increases, it is more 
likely that inconsistent elements can be retained without causing undue 
anxiety in the system. Additionally, the degree of organisation also 
permits the resolution of inconsistencies by explaining the inconsis-
tency rather than denying or distorting one or both incongruent elements. 
It would appear that high complexity individuals use essentially 
different modes of inconsistency resolution 1n dealing with what may be 
termed unbalanced configurations [Heider, 19.58, PP• 11J-114s Abelson, 
1959; Kaplan & Crockett, 1968; Kelman & l3a.ron, 1968]. 
It seems clear tha.t the level of cognitive complexity will affect 
an individual's tendency to rely upon balance formulations in con-
struing social reality. If balance affects the attributions of indi-
viduals faced with inconsistent ac1;or-a.ction situations, then the 
observer's level of cognitive complexity should affect the nature of 
the observer's attributions as well, such that attributions should be 
less likely to reflect primarily either dispositionaJ. or circumstantial 
causal loci -- they will probably reflect emphases upon both. Scarlett, 
Press and Crockett (1971] found that children's descriptions of peers 
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were more differentiated as the developmental level of their construct 
systems were higher. -In iart. they reported, the developmental level 
was related to.increasing age [also reported by Rosenba.ch, Crockett & 
~Wapner, 197J]. Baldwin and Baldwin [1970] have also demonstrated that 
attributional complexity may also increase with age (although Kelley 
has maintained that simple causal schemas such as ba.lance clearly may 
also predominate in adult attributions). They asked pre-school children, 
eighth-graders, and college students to explain a child's kindness 
based on a story about his actions, the circumstances and the conse-
quences. Although their results are subject to competing explanations, 
there appeared a trend for the younger subjects to refer to essentially 
to dispositional explanations reflecting the assumptions that "behavior 
is behavior" and "good actions indicate good persons." In this regard 
it is interesting to note recent research that indicates that the 
tendency to fashion impressions that recognize and integrate conflicting 
and inconsistent information decreases as emotional involvement of the 
perceiver in the situation increases [Rosenba.ch, Crockett & Wapner, 1973]0 
Thus, it is predicted that high complexity observers will make 
attributions that rely less upon ba.lanc1ng schemas than will low 
complexity observers. This effect should be enhanced when the pheno-
menal situation involves inconsistencies between the observeres exper-
ienced sentiment towa.:rd the actor and experienced sentiment towards the 
actor's behavior. 
Communication Consequences ,2lDifferent::La.l Attributions 
It makes intuitive sense that individuals will be disposed to 
interact with another person in certain modes depending upon the attri-
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but1ons they make about the causes of the other's behavior. Unfortu-. 
nately, there has not been extensive and direct research in this a~ea, 
But it is clear that different attributions will lead to different 
actions. For example, the reciprocation of ha._~ and benefit may 
depend upon whether or not an individual judges the source to have 
ca.used the initial ha.m or help [Ke+ley, 1971a, pp. 14-15; 1973, PP• 
126-127]. In a study of the effects of "can" and "trying" attributions 
r 
upon the nature of messages supervisors send to subordinates~ Stroup 
1 
[1974] found that more attempts were made to motivate ''high ability" 
I 
subordinates when assigning them to jobs that "high effort" and "high 
trying" subordinates. other than this one study, there seems no~ to 
have been any direct tests of the effects of attributions upon fnter-
personal communication, This is an area that deserves further study 
and will be explored in this study, 
HYPOTHESES 
The purpose of,this study is to investigate the effects of 
balance, interdependence and cognitive complexity upon the attribu-
tional tendencies of observers and the nature of observers; post-attri-
bution communication with the observer actor, The preceding discussion 
makes it possible to stipulate predictions for the effects of each of 
the three variables upon ~ttributions, As was stated above, the inter-
personal communication consequences of differential attributions is 
exploratory in nature, 
This study will construct a si·~uation in which actively ,(interde-
pendent) and passively (independent) involved observers either like or 
do not like an actor who performs either a positive or a negative act. 
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Ba.lance 
The first general hypothesis is that there will be differences 
in the nature of observers' causal attributions which will be related 
to differences in their degree of liking for an actor and differences 
in the positivity of the actor's behavior. Both actively and passively 
involved subjects will be affected by these differences. Specifically, 
it is predicted that observers in congruent behavioral situations --
positive sentiment and positive act, or negative sentiment and nega-
tive act -- will make more internal, dispositional attributions about 
the ca.uses of the actor's behavior than will observers in incongruent 
behavioral situations-~ positive sentiment and negative act, or nega-
tive sentiment and positive act. Conversel~, it is also predicted that 
observers in incongruent beha.vio:r:al situations will make more external, 
circumstantial attributions about the causes of an actor's behavior 
than will observers in congruent behavioral situations. 
Involvement 
The second general hypothesis is th~t there will be differences 
in the nature of observers' causal attributions related to differences 
in their degree of interdependent involvement with the actor in the 
situation. Specifically, it is predicted that in incongruent behavioral 
situations, observers who are interdependent with the actor will make 
more external, circumstantial attributions that will observers who are 
noto The higher hedonic relevance of the implications of predictive 
failure taking precedence over the hedonic relevance of the nature of 
the actor's behavior accounts for this prediction. For simplicity, 
those observers who are interdependent with the actor shall be referred 
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to as "actively" involved, and those observers who are not interdepen-
dent with the actor shall be referred to af.? "passively" involved. In 
negatively congruent beha.vioml situations (negative sentiment and 
negative behavior) and positively congruent beha.viora.l situations 
(positive sentiment and positive behavior), the attributions of 
actively and passively involved observers are not expected to differ 
appreciably, although there may be a tendency for actively involved 
observers in the positive congruence condition to use dispositional 
and self-attributions (among other circumstantial factors) more tha.n 
passively involved observers. Likewise there ma.y be a tendency in 
the negative congruence condition for actively involved observers to 
be slightly more dispositional in their attributions than passively 
involved observers, 
Cognitive Complexity 
The third general hypothesis is tha.t there will be differences 
in the nature of observers' causal attributions related to differences 
in their level of cognitive complexity. Specifically, it is predicted , 
that observers high in cognitive complexity will be less subject to 
balancing tendencies, such that they will evidence a more proportinate 
distribution of causal attributions across both internal (disposi-
tional) and external ( circumsta.ntia.l) factors. However, it may be that 
the effects of cognitive complexity will be attentua.ted as interde-
pendence (involvement) with the actor in the situation increases 




Subjects were undergraduate students at the University of 
Kansas. All subjects were volunteer participants :paid at the rate of 
$4.00 per experimental session. The initial sample contained 81 Ss. 
Two were dropped due to susipicion of the,experimental deception and 
manipulations. Two were dropped from the dependent measures analysis 
due to late arrival at the experimental session which prevented them 
from completeing the cognitive complexity measure. 
I!l2. Experimental Session 
The experimental session involved four naive.§!. and one confede-, 
rate. Ss were led to believe that they were to participate in a study 
of communication networks. 
When the.§§. reported to the session they were irµ-ormed that 
another experimenter had requested a small portion of time to conduct 
some preliminary investigation into social perception. The other 
experimenter then distributed and§§. completed the Social Perception 
Questionnaire which wa.s used to score cognitive complexity (Appendix A). 
Ss were then introduced to the supposed communication network 
study. They were info:rmed that four aspects of networks would be 
focused upona the effects of acquaintance between members 1n a network; 
how information a.bout people as well as about the task gets transferred 
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and processed in networks; how different kinds of involvement affect 
the operation of networks; and how networks can reorganize internally. 
The explanation of these factors was designed to make the experimental 
setting congruent with rea.1-world situations. 
Ss were then instructed to complete two questio~ires 
Member Information (Appendix B) and Member Attitudes (Appendix c). 
They were told that this information corresponded to da.ta one might 
naturally acquire about others 1n the course of working with them. 
They were informed tha.t the information would then be exchanged among 
the network members in a predetermined manner so as to introduce 
different degrees of acqua.inta.nce among members. From this point on 
all Ss operated out of individual rooms. The experimenter acted as 
messenger for all subsequent transfer of information. 
When§.§. had completed the two initial questionnaires, their 
attitude questionnaires were given to a confederate who constructed 
either similar or dissimilar questionnaires, which were purported to 
be the confederate's own, for each §.according to a method discussed 
below. He also constructed an Interpersonal Judgment Sea.le (Appendix 
D) for each S-that indicated that he did or did not like them. Ss 
were instructed that when they received information from other partici-
pants they were to record their reactions to that person on the Inter-
personal Judgment Scale. In some cases they were to receive someone 
else's reaction to them before they were to record their reaction. 
Thus, each naive.§. received both an attitude questionnaire and a report 
of lilting or disliking from the confederate before they recorded their 
reaction to him. These procedures accomplished the manipulation of 
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liking or not liking, a.nd served a.s a check of that manipulationo 
Next, by means of a bogus lottery, Ss and the confederate were 
assigned positions in a pyra.l)lidal network configuration (Appendix I). 
The confederate always 'received the central position 1n the network and, 
therefore, was always the problem selector for the task. Two naive Ss 
were randomly assigned the-role of problem solvers; the other two naive 
Ss were randomly assigned to be recorders. The task involved the 
solving of seven pattern recognition problems in fifteen minutes 
(Appendix H). The problem selector's role was structured as selecting 
the tasks each problem solver would work on; selections were said to be 
'ma.de from a pool of one-hundred such tasks. The problems were assigned 
bogus difficulty ratings ranging from "very easy" to "extrenely diffi-
cult" (Append.ix I). In actuality, each problem solver received the 
same seven problems in exactly the same order. The first six were 
actually relatively easy, while the seventh was extremely difficult~ 
This procedure was followed to insure that b~th of the problem solvers 
experienced the same degree of success and used a.bout the same a.mount 
of time. The seventh problem wa~ never acknowledged as correctly solved. 
The situation was so structured that the problem selector and the 
problem solver could communicate only by means of written messages 
during the task. Messages were written on 8½ x .5½ sheets with "TO: 
__ " and "FROM: __ " a.t the top. However, the observers only 
received a carbon copy of the message, which they recorded on forms 
provided by 1the experimenter (Appendix H). Ea.ch recorder kept track of 
the interaction between the confederate and one~. 
For one.§., the message received from the confederate was always 
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positive and encouraging; for the other§., they were always negative 
and critical. 
Thus, a condition existed in which the Ss either liked or did 
not like the confederate, who behaved either positively or negatively, 
toWp.rd them. In each experimental session there were two actively 
I 
involved Ss (interdependent), two passively involved Ss, and actor 
behavior that was either congruent or incongruent with the relation-
ship between the confederate and the Ss. 
At the conclusion of the task, the Ss were instructed to complete 
the "Information Processing" questionnaire (Appendix F). This composed 
the dependent measure on attributions. It also contained a post-action 
check of liking using the Interpersonal Judgment Sea.le. 
When Ss had completed the "Information Processing" form, they 
were informed that the exact same task with different problems was to 
' be conducted again. Before that, however, they were to complete the 
"Network Reorganization" questionnaire (Appendix G). They were to 
construct any message they desired to be sent to the problem selector 
( confederate) and read by him before the task resumed. This form. also 
included a check on how Ss ha.d seen the confederate's behavior. When 
Ss ha.d completed this fo~, they were informed tha.t the experiment 
wa.s over. The total session lasted approximately two hours. 
Independent Variables~ Manipulations 
Of the four independent variables, three -- relation, action, a.nd 
involvement -- were manipulated, The fourth -- cognitive complexity --
' involved existing differences between Ss and was used as a randomized -
block factor. 
Relation. There were two levels of relation -- like and not 
like. Both conditions were manipulated using attitude similarity and 
revealed reciprocal liking. In the like condition, the§. received a 
"Member Attitude Questionnaire" purported to have been comp~eted by 
the confederate in which 80 per cent of the attitude items, randomly 
selected, were answered exactly as the§. had answered them previously. 
In the not like condition, the proportions of agreement and disagree-
ment were reversed, so that the confederate a.greed with the§. on only 
20 per cent of the items, These percentages were chosen on the basis 
of previous use by Byrne [1971], In addition, in the like condition, 
the§. received information recorded on the Interpersonal Judgment 
Sea.le [Byrne, 1971] purportedly completed by the confederate which 
indicated that the confederate either lilted the§. ("I feel that I 
would probably like this person,") or did not like the§. ("I feel I 
would probably dislike this person."). 
After the§. had received both bits of information about and 
from the confederate, he recorded his reaction to the confederate on 
the Interpersonal Judgment Scale. This wa.s the manipulation of relation. 
Action, There were two levels of action -- positive and nega-
tive. In the positive condition the~ received communication purported 
to have originated wi'iji the confederate as problem selector that wa.s 
always supportive, friendly, and encouraging concerning the completion 
I 
of the experimental task (Appendix E). In the negative action condi-
tion, the communication was always petulant and unfriendly (Appendix 
E). At the conclusion of the task, the§. recorded his view of the 
confederate's behavior on four dimensions as a manipulation check. 
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Interdependent Involvement. There were two levels of involve-
ment -- active and passive. In the active condition, the.§. was directly 
involved in the completion of the task assigned by the confederate. 
The S's role was that of a problem solver. In the passive condition, 
the S was merely an observer, simply recording all communication bet-
ween the confederate and an actively involved§.. In the active condi-
tion, the .§.'s behavior regarding the task depended upon the confederate's 
selection of problems. The problem solver and the problem selector 
could exchange messages. In the passive condition, the.§. was not 
involved whatsoever in solving problems. No messages were sent 
directly to this.§. and he could not communicate with other participants. 
Cognitive Complexity. This variable was measured by a shortened 
version of the Four Role Category Questionnaire [Crockett, 1965] (see 
Appendix A -- "Social Perception Questionnaire"). The§. was asked to 
think of two persons -- a liked and disliked person of the §.'s same age 
and sex. After being given a few minutes to think of these two persons 
' and mental~y compare and contrast them, the§. was asked to describe 
ea.ch of them as fully as possible. Three minu~es was allowed: for '!ihe 
completion of each description. The ~soriptions were scored for the 
number 'of interpersonal constructs used 1n each; the sum of the two 
' 
numbers was the ind.ex of CODLplexi ty. The scores were arranged in order ..... 
and divided at the median to form two levels of complexity. A second 
scorer scored a random sample of the questionnaires to determine the 
reliability of the scoring.> The correlation between scorers was +.97. 
Summary gt :!fh!. Design 
The experiment was conducted basically as a 24 factorial design. 
One factor -- cognitive complexity, (high versus low) -- involved 
differences between.§§.; the other three factors -- like versus not 
relation, positive versus negative action, and active (interdependent) 
versus passive involvement -- corresponded to the experimental manipu-
lations. 
Dependent Measures 
Two dependent variables were analyzed: attributions and communi-
cation. Observers' attributions were analyzed first on a single inter-
nal-external scale, and, second, on a form that differentiated plausible 
causes into five loci -- personality, circumstances, mood, motivation 
' \ 
and other persons. 
Observers' communications to the confederate actor were analyzed 
in a 3 x 2 grid, one axis consisting of personality and circumstances, 
\ 
the other axis being composed of negative reinforcement, positive · 
reinforcement, and adoptlqn of beha.vi~r. 
" ~.,,., .. 
Attributions. The ma.in dependent measure consisted of two scales • 
.§§. were first requested to rate from Oto 100 ea.ch ot the five expla-
nations in terms of how well ea.ch accounted for the actor•s behavior, 
' 
where a O implied an extremely poor explanation, SO implied an explana-
tion somewhere between extremely poor and excellent, and 100 implied 
an excellent explanation of the actor's behavior. Second, Ss were 
instructed to check a point on a.n internal-external scale of attribu-
> 
tions that represented in general their estimation of the effects upon 
the confederate's behavior of underlying cha.ra.cteristics of the person 
(scale point 1) and the pressures a.nd expectations ind.1ginous to the 
situation (scale point 10). 
J? 
Communication. The messages that the Ss sent to the confederate 
actor were analyzed according to the strategy adopted in influencing 
the actor's future task behavior. Since this was an exploratory 
portion of the study, the analysis was intended to reveal any differ-
ences in the approaches of§§. to the confederate. Strategies were 
conceived along two dimensions: the content of the message and the 
rationale of the message. Message content was of three kinds: 
negative reinforcement (messages explicitly disconfirming previous 
behavior) based upon either personality (i.e., "Don't be so tyrannical,") 
or circumstances (i.e., "Don't keep telling me to hurry up because when 
I do I los~ accuracy."); positive reinforcement (messages explicitly 
confirming previous behavior) based upon personality (i.e., "You are 
a very effective selector in terms of motivating others.") or circum-
stances (i.e., "Your leadership is great as you don't give her problems 
harder that she is ca:p3,ble of solving in the time you ha.ve.H); and 
adoption (messages explicitly suggesting new behaviors to be adopted) 
based upon personality (i.e., "Add a tone of humanity to your notes.'') 
and circumstances (i.e., "Since the problems a.re all of equa.l value, 
choose the easiest ones."). Messages basing their strategy upon the 
actor's personality were messages the.t appeared to place the burden of 
change upon a change in the actor's dispositions to behave 1n particular 
manners. They did not cite or recognise the mitigating influence of 
circumstantial factors. On the other hand, messages basing their 
strategy upon circumstances cited situational elements that supported 
the recommended course of action. In addition, the quantity of the 
messages was computed, with the unit of analysis being independent 
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clauses in the communication, A second scorer scored a randomly 
selected sample of the messages, The correlation between scorers was: 
quantity, +,93; negative reinforcement-person, +.97: negative rein-
forcement-circwnstances, +.90; positive reinforcement-person, +.96; 
positive reinforcement-circumstances, +,84; adoption-person, +,93; 
and adoption~circwnstances, +1.00. There was a.n additional-category 
that was not analyzed into which were placed all clauses not directly 
r~lated to content or strategy (i.e., simple descriptions and greetings). 
Data Analysis 
Since the cell sizes were not equal (see Table 1), a harmonic 
n analysis of variance was perfomed on the dependent measures. The 
external-internal attribution scale was analyzed in a 24 factorial 
analysis, as was each of the five causal loci and each of the communi-
cation categories, In addition, in order to acquire a.n idea of the 
pattern of attributions in each df the experimental conditions, a. 
repeated measures analysis was run in a 2x2x2x2xS design, with repeated 
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This chapter reports the results of tests for confirmation of 
the hypothesesu Summary tables for all analyses of variance appear in 
Append.ix J~ The hypotheses concerning the effects of balance~ inter-
dependent involvement and complexity upon attributions shall be pre-
sented first, then the results bearing upon the exploratory investiga-
tion of interpersonal comm.unica.tione 
Success .Qf Experimental Yanipulations 
The manipulations of like and not like relations proved 
successful. Checks on§§.' lilting for the confederate actor were 
completed immediately after the manipulation of similarity and revealed 
liking, and soon after the Ss had been exposed to the beha.v;or of the 
actoro Ss exposed to the like manipulation reported significantly 
greater liking for the actor than those Ss exposed to the not like 
manipulation ('.I.able 2) (t=17.41, df=?7, p(.oo;). In a post-action 
analysis, there was also a significant difference in the expected 
direction (t=9.64, df:::l"/7, p(.005). There was no significant change in 
liking as a result of exposure to the actor's behavior for Ss who 
initially liked the confederate actor (t=1.J1, df=77, p)~lO). However, 
there was a significant change for§§. who initially disliked the actor 
(t=-2~25, df=77, p(~OJ). Nevertheless, there remained a highly signifi-




Mean Liking Ra:i;ings 
Like Not Like 
' 
Pre-Action 2.1.5 5.70 
Post..-Aotion 2 • .54 .5.10 
i==Hproba.bly like this person very much" 
7 ... "prooobly dislike this pe:rson very much" 
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The manipulation of positive and negative action wa.s also 
successful (Table 3). The four feedback items in the "network 
{ 
Reorganization" questionnaire served as a :manipulation check. It was 
important that the experimental problems be seen by.§.§. as essentially 
neutral in terms of difficulty. Both the recipients of positive and 
negative action reported that the problems were "a.bout right" (t=-1.48, 
df='/7, p)..10). In terms of the other three dimensions, the groups did 
differ significantly, confirming the success of the manipulation. 
Recipients of negative action saw the actor's contribution to task 
accomplishment as not helpful, positive action recipients saw it as 
helpful ( t=-4. 77, df=??, p(. 005), the nature of the interpersonal 
relationship established by the actor was reported as "negative" by 
negative action .§!!, and ''positive" by positive action §!! (t=1J.0.5, 
df=77, p(.00,5); and the actor~s manner of motivating others was seen 
as "inappropriate and ineffective" by§§. receiving negative action, 
and as Happropriate and effective" by positive action§!. (t=-9.14, 
df='/7, P(•005). 
1h.! Attribution HYpOtheses 
The attribution hypotheses concerned the effect~ of balance, 
interdependence and cognitive complexity upon the causal attributions 
of observers. The results of each applicable analysis will be pre-
sented in order and their bearing upon the three hypotheses indicated. 
The hypotheses asserted that there would be a general balancing 
tendency for all.§!., but that within that prediction, different levels 
of interdependence and cognitive complexity would produce differential 
reactions to balancing tendencies. 
TABLE 3 
Mean Action Ratings 
F.a.se of Actor's Contri- Nature of Actor's 
Probleas bution to Ta.sk Interpersonal Manner of 
Accomplishment Relationship Motivation 
Positive 5.43 6.33 1.90 7068 
Negative 5.0Q 4.10 6.9() 3.87 
Probleasa 1•"auch :t;oo difficult"; 9•"muoh too ea.ey" 
Contr1but1on1. 1•"1.ow -- not at all helpful "s 9•"high -
was ver, helpful" 
Relat1onsh1pa 1•"positive"1 9•"nega.t1ve• 
Motivation, 1•"1nappropr1a.te and 1neff'ect1ve"1 9•"a.ppropr1ate 
and. effective" 
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Ba.lance, The balance hypothesis wa.s generally supported@ The 
repeated measures analysis revealed tb.at the factors significantly 
affecting the attributional tendencies of.§§. were Relation and Action. 
The Causal Locus x Relation x Action interaction was significant (F= 
4.848, df=4,244, p=.001). Ta.ble 4 represents the pattern of attribu-
tional ascriptions of the four Relation x Action groups. Simple tests 
on the mean percentage ratings for the four groups at each of the 
causal loci (Table 5) indicated the following significant differences. 
Regarding personality, the not like/negative group saw person-
ality as significantly more important as a causative factor than like/ 
negative groups (F=6.298, df=1,244, p=.025), and like/positive groups 
saw personality as a more important causative factor than the like/ 
negative group (F=B.1.58, df=1,244, p=.005). Other differences revealed 
by a Tukey-B analysis are presented in Table 5. 
For circumstances, the like/negative group saw it as more signi-
ficant than the not like/negative group (F=S,750, df=1,244, p=.025), 
and the like/negative group saw circumstances as more important than 
the like/positive group (F=11,806, df=1,244, p=.001). Other differences 
indicated by a Tukey-B analysis are listed in Table 5. 
There were no significant differences between any of the Relation 
x Action groups on mood or motivation. Differences revealed by a 
Tukey-Bana.lysis are listed in Ta.ble 5. 
For the other person locus, not like/negative groups sa.w it as 
a more important causative factor than the like/negative groups (F=8.970, 
df=1,244, p=.005), and as more important than the not like/positive 
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Mean Percentage Ratings of Causa.11 
Loci by Relation a.nd Action 
Like Like Not Like 
Positive Negative Positive 
66196 a.A 41.9 A 58i>1aAC 
sa.o 87.6 69 .. J 
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.52.7aAB S8e2 aB 64.J aA 
4,5.8 J6.J 44.8 











1Mea.ns in the same row do not differ significantly 
at .05 by the Tukey-B test if they share a common 
lower-case subscripts Those in the same column 
do not differ significantly if they share a common 
upper-case subscript. 
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Tukey-B test are listed in Table 5. 
This same general pattern was also noted in the internal-external 
attributional scale analysis. There was a significant Relation x 
Action interaction (F=18.519, df=1,61, p=.001). Analysis of the group 
means (Table 6) with simple tests indicated that the not like/negative 
groups were significantly more internal than like/negative groups (F= 
25.923, df=1,61, p=.001), more internal than not like/positive groups 
(F=?.362, df=1,61, p=.01), and like/positive groups were significantly 
more internal than the like/negative groups (F=12.694, df=1,61, p=.001). 
In general, the tendency of observers in the experimental 
conditions to operate according to a balance principle in attributing 
the causes of an actor's behavior was as predicted in the balance 
hypotheses. The significant interaction was Relation x Action. Attri-
butions of ~sin congruent situations were generally more internal than 
attributions of§.§. in incongruent situationse The most notable 
exception was in the use of mood as a. causa.l factor. While the 
differences between the groups was in the predicted direction, the 
differences were not significant. The infiuence of the strain toward 
balance appeared to be most influential for incongruent groups (like/ 
negative and not like/positive), especially the like/negative group. 
Involvement (interdependence) and complexity showed no signifi-
cant ma.in effects for the pattern of attributions ma.de by.§!. in the 
experimental situation. They were, however, involved in significant 
between groups interactions. The Relation x Action x Involvement inter-
action was significant (F=4.242, df•1,61, p=.044). The Action x 
Involvement x Complexity Interaction was also significant (F=11.060, 
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- Ta.ble 6 








4.9,5 Aa 6 • .50 
1 ' ) Means in the same row do not differ signi-
ficantly at .0.5 by the Tukey-B test if they 
share a common lower-case subscript. Those 
in the sa.me colum do not differ significantly 






1 Mean Percentage Ratings 
Relation x Action 
Positive Negative 
Action At!'hinn 
66.58 A 41.95 
.sa.10 Aa. 63.89 a 
1Means in the same row do not differ significantly 
at .05 by the Tukey-B test if they share a common 
lower-case subscript. Those in the same column 
do not differ significantly if they share a 
common upper-case subscript. 
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positive group also saw personality as a more significant causo.tive 
explanation than did the like/negative group (F==?.842, df•i,61, p=.01). 
The fact that the not like/positive group did not differ significantly 
from the other groups is a replication of the same result found in the 
repeated measures analysis. But, in general, the congruent groups sa.w 
personality as a better expla.na.tion for action than did incongruent 
like/negative groups. 
Analysis of the significant Relation x Involvement x Complexity 
interaction (Table 8) showed that (1) when low complex Ss were actively 
(interdependently) involved, not like groups saw personality as more 
significant tha.n like groups (F=5,060, df=1,61, p=.05), (2) when low 
complex Ss were in the not like condition, actively involved Ss saw 
' personality as significantly more influential than passively involved 
§§. (F=5.J15, df-1,61, p=,025), (J) when§§. were passively involved in 
the like condition, low complex§§. saw personality as more important 
than high complex§!. (F-4.J04, df=1,61, p•,05), and (4) when.§.! were 
passively involved 1n the not like condition, high complex§.§. saw 
personality as significantly more important than low complex.§.! (F= 
7.719, df=i,61, p=.01). 
Analysis of the significant Action x Involvement x Complexity 
intexa.ction (Table 9) showed that when low complex§§. were actively 
' involved, they saw personality as a more significant causal explanation 
when exposed to a positive action than when exposed to a negative 
l 
action (F=6,995, df=1,61, p=,025). When~ were passively involved and 
exposed to positive actions, high complex~ saw personality as a better 




Mean Percentage Ra.tings1 




High Low High Low 
62.50Aa 43.85a 50.14a. 58.60a 
55.42Aa 72.5oa.b 75.oob 40.00a 
1Mea.ns in the same row do not differ signifi-
cantly a.t .05 by the Tukey-B test if they share 
a. common lower-case subscript. Those in the 
same column do not differ significantly if they 
aha.re a COJIIIllon upper-case subscript. 
Table 9 
Personality 
Mean Percentage Rat1ngs1 




Active Passive . 
I 
High Low High Low 
,52.78Aa.b 70.42a 73.a9Aa. 49.ooAb 
62.73Aa. 3$.89b .53.45Aa.b ,52.13Aab 
1Means in the same row do not differ signifi-
cantly at .0.5 by the Tukey-B test if they aha.re 
a common lower-case subscript. Those in the 
same column do not differ significantly if they 
share a common upper-case subscript. 
53 
df=i,61, p=.05). 
None of these three-way interactions were predicted. The 
hypotheses suggested that different levels of interdependence and 
cognitive complexity would differentially affect§!,' responses within 
, 
a balance condition or, in other words, a Relation x Action interaction. 
It would appear that involvement and complexity interact differently 
in response to Relation and Action, Although there wa.s a. significant 
Relation x Action interaction, it would appear tha.t in terms of attri-
butions to personality, involvement of an interdependent nature and 
cognitive complexity function independently of balanced and unba.la.nced 
con£1gu:rations, 
In terms of the relation between Ss (observers) a.nd the actor, 
when§!. are :passively involved, high complex Ss referred to personality 
a.s a better explanation of behavior than did low complex§§. when both 
groups did not like the actor. However, these tendencies were rever~ed 
when§!. liked the actor, Wheni were interdependently involved with 
the actor, low complex§!. who did not like the actor saw the actor's 
internal dispositions as a more significant cause of his behavior than 
did low complex§!. who liked the actor. Finally, when low complex Ss 
did not like the actor, those who were interdependently involved saw 
internal, personality factors as a better explanation of an actor's 
behavior than did§!. who were not so involved. 
In terms of the actor's behavior, when low complex.§!. were 
interdependently involved with the actor, positive behavior prompted 
greater causal ascriptions to personality than negative behavior, In 
addition, when passively involved§.§. were the recipients of positive 
behavior, hie;h complex Ss saw personality as more of a causative 
factor than did low complex Ss. 
In summary, the analysis of personality attributions provided no 
direct support for either the interdependent involvemnt or the com-
plexity hypotheses, although there was supp~rt, again, for the general 
b~lance hypothesis, 
Circumstances. The analysis of Ssf attributions to circumstances 
provided no support for the interdependenc'e and complexity hypotheses, 
There was a main effect due to Action (F=6.349, df=1,61, p=.014) and a 
significant Relation x Action interaction (F=6.158, df•1,61, p=.016). 
Negative behavior was ascribed more to circumstances than positive 
behavior (Table 10), This tendency, however, depended upon the relation 
to the actor (Table 11). When~ liked the actor and were exposed to 
negative behavior, they ascribed the action more to circumstances than 
when exposed to negative behavior from an actor they did not like (F= 
6,081, df=1,61,p=.025). In addition, circumstances was seen as a more 
significant causative factor when.§§. liked an actor who behaved nega-
tively than when they liked an actor behaving positively (F=12.379, 
df=1 1 61, p=.001), This result replicates the effects seen in the 
repeated measures analy~is and offers support for the balance hypothesis. 
~. The analysis of .§.§. • attributions to mood revealed two 
significant interactions: Action x Involvement (F=6.J52, df=1,61, 
p=.014) and Relation x Action x Involvement (F=9.723, df=1»61, p= 
.OOJ). Analysis of the Action x Involvement interaction revealed that 
those Ss passively involved with the actor attributed negative actions 












Mean Percentage Ratings 1 
Relation x Acti?n 
Positive Negative 
58.1; A 87.68 
Not Like 69,29 66.67 
A:,,. 1::1 
1Means in the same row do not differ 
significantly at .05 by the Tukey-B 
test if they share a common lower-case 
subscripto Those in the same column 
do not differ significantly if they 
share a common upper-case subscript. 
addition, those Ss exposed to positive behavior attributed the behavior 
to mood more When they were actively (interdependently) involved than 
when they were passively involved (F=5.822, df=i,61, p=.01). The mean 
percentage ratings for mood appear in Table 12. 
The analysis of the Relation x Action x Involvement interaction 
bears directly upon the interdependent involvement hypothesis. The 
mean percentage ratings for the three-way interaction (Table 13) indi-
cate that in the not like/positive incongruent condition, actively 
involved Ss saw mood -- an external causal loci -- as significantly 
more explanatory of the actor's behavior than did passively involved 
Ss (F=B.259, df=1,61, p=.005). This provides partial confirmation of 
-the prediction that in incongruent situations, interdependently involved 
observers would use more external attributions than passively involved 
observers. There is also direct support for the prediction that in 
negatively congruent conditions interdependently involved observers 
will be less dispositional in their causal attributions that will 
passively involved observers. Analysis revealed that in the not like/ 
negative condition passively involved§§. differed significantly in the 
predicted direction from interdependently involved.§.§. (F=S.571, df= 
1,61, p=.025). Interdependently involved Ss were less circumstantial 
than passively involved Ss. 
Other significant findings in this three-way interaction did 
not directly confirm aspects of the involvement hypothesis. More than 
anything else, they provided further support for the ba.la.nce hypothesis. 
Ss in the like/negative condition saw mood as significantly more influ-
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1Means in the same row do not differ signi-
ficantly at .05 by the Tukey-B test if they 
share a common lower-case subscript. Those 
in the same column do not differ significantly 
if they $ha.Te a common upper-case subscript. 
Table 13 
Mood 
Mean Percenta.ge Rat1ngs1 






Active Passive Active Passive 
34~20 27.78 50.64 1}01163 
, A.h A:>.. h Aj:th 
56.36 20.00 23.33 55,56 
a Ab b Aa 
Means in the same row do not differ signi-
ficantly at .05 by the Tukey-B test if they 
share a. common lower-case subscript. Those 
in the same column do not differ significantly 
if they share a common upper-case subscript. 
the not like/negative condition (F=4.400, df=1,61, p=a05)o In addi-
tion, Ss interdependently involved saw mood as a significantly more 
explanatory cause of the actor's behavior when they were in the not 
like/positive condition than when in the not like/negative condition 
(F=6.439, df=1,61i p=.025). Thus, Ss actively (interdependently) 
involved in incongruent conditions saw mood as a greater causative 
factor than~ interdependently involved in congruent conditions. 
Motivation. The analysis of the causal ascrip~ions made to 
motivation revealed one significant three-way interaction -- Action x 
Involvement x
1
Complexity (F=S.498, df=i,61, p=.022), The interpreta-
tion of this interaction in terms of the interdependent involvement 
and complexity hypothesis is confounded, however, by the fact that Ss 
in the incongruent conditions were interpreting motivation as an essen-
tially circumstantial factor, while.§§. in congruent conditions inter-
preted motivation as basically internal and dispositional in natureo 
No simple tests were significant in the analysis of this inte1--a.ction, 
but two t-tests were. An analysis of the mean percentage ratings for 
motivation (Table 14) revealed two differences. When Ss were of low 
complexity and interdependently involved, they ascribed greater attri-
butional potency to motivation when exposed to positive behavior than 
when exposed to negative behavior (t=2~087, df=19, p=.025)a When~ 
were interdependently involved 1n the reception of negative behavior, 
high complex Ss saw motivation as a better explanation of behavior than 
low complex Ss (t=1.734, df=18, p=,05). Neither of these results 
supported the hypotheses, 




Mea.n Percentage Ra.t1ngs1 
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49.67Aa 69,58Aa .5B,JJAa 54 • .50Aa 
68.18Aa 40.;56Ab .50.,56Aa.l: sa.7.5Aa 
1Means in the same row do not differ signifi-
cantly at .05 by the Tukey-B test if they 
aha.re a comm.on lower-case subscript. Those 
in the same col1llll.n do not differ significantly 
if they share a common upper-case subscript. 
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revealed one significant three-way interaction -- Action x Involvement 
x Complexity (F=10.786, df=i,61, p=.002). Subsequent analysis of this 
interaction offered no clear support for the interdependent Involve-
ment or Complexity hypotheses. 
The analysis of the mean percentage ratings for other persons 
(Table 15) did reveal that when low complex§.§. were passively involved, 
negative behavior produced more ascription to other persoas than did 
positive behavior (F=4.66J, df=1,61, p=.05); when.§§. were the passive 
recipients of positive behavior, high complex Ss attributed the action 
more to other persons than did low complex §a. (F=S.894, df=i,61, p=.025); 
and when§.§. were the interdependent recipients of negative behavior, 
high complex§.§. attributed the action more to other persons than did 
low complex§§. (F=6.J67, df=i,61, p=.025). 
Internal-External Attribution Scale. Analysis of§§.' responses 
on the internal-external attribution scale revealed a significant ma.in 
effect for Relation (discussed above), a significant Relation x Action 
intemction (discussed above), a significant Relation x Involvement x 
Complexity interaction (F=J.983, df=1,61, p=.05), and a significant 
Action x Involvement x Complexity interaction (F=S.173, df=i,61, p= 
.026). These effects provide no direct support for the Involvemnt and 
Complexity hypotheses. 
Analysis of the Relation x Involvement x Complexity (Table 16) 
intemction revealed that when high complex~ were actively involved 
{interdependently) they made IllOre dispositional a~tributions in the not 
like condition than in the like condition (F=S.288, df=i,61, p=.01). 
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40.,56 
al .51.~~ 49._'ft1: 28. oob 
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1Means in the same row do not differ signi-
ficantly at o0J by the Tukey-B test if they 
share a common lower-case subscripta Those 
in the same column do not differ if they 
share a common upper-case subscript. 
Table 16 
Internal-External ~ttribution Scale 
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if they share a common upper-case subscript. 
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(F=6.458, df=i,61, p=.025). 
Analysis of the mean percentage :ratings for the Action x Involve-
ment x Complexity interaction (Table 17) revealed that interdependently 
involved §§.made more dispositional attributions than did passively 
involved Ss when they were highly complex and exposed to negative 
behavior (F=4.151, df=1,61, p=.05). When 2.§. were interdependently 
involved and exposed'to negative behavior, high complex.§.§. ma.de more 
dispositional attributions than low complex§.§. (F=6.731, dfa1,61, p=o025). 
Summary~ the Attribution Hy;potheses 
Ba.lance. There was compelling support for the Ba.lance hypothesis 
predictions • .§.§.incongruent conditions ma.de more dispositional (inter-
nal) attributions than Ss in incongruent conditions. Likewise,.§§. in 
incongruent conditions made more s1tua.t1ona.l (external) attributions 
than§.§. in congruent conditions. This tendency was stronger 1n the like 
conditions than the not like conditions • .§.§. behaved as predicted except 
for mood attributions, although the results were in the predicted 
direction. The Relation x Action interaction appeared to be the ma.in 
predictor of attributional tendencies. 
Involvement. There was minimum support for the Involvement 
hypothesis predictions. Attributions to mood provided the only direct 
support. Hypotheses supported were that in incongruent situations 
interdependently involved observers would use more external attribu-
tions than passively involved observers. Also supported was the hypo-
thesis that in negatively congruent situations, interdependently 
involved observers would be less dispositional than passively involved 
observers. The involvement factor most frequently interacted with 
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Table 17 
Internal-External Attribution Scale 
Action x Involvement x Complexity 1 
Active Passive 
High Low High Low, 
Like 4.6"' 5.5ib 6.11b 5.00 Aa 
Not Like 6.18 4.11 4.56 4.75 Aa. 13. a. 
, 1Mea.ns in the same row do not differ signifi-
cantly at .05 by the Tukey-B test if they share 
a common lower-case subscript. Those in the 
same column do not differ sign1£ica.rttly if 
they share a common upper-case subscripto 
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complexity and relation, or complexity and action. Involvement did 
have significant effects on Ss' attributions to causa.l loci, but rarely 
in the predicted manner. 
Complexitr. There was no direct support for the Complexity 
hypothesis predictions.· Complexity did not interact significantly 
with Relation and Action -- such three-way interactions being the basis 
for the predictions. Complexity did significantly affect Ss' attribu-
tional tendencies, but onJ.y in three-way interactions that were not 
predicted (Relation x Involvement x Complexity and Action x Involvement 
x Complexity). 
Overall, the Ba.la.nee hypothesis was supported, but the effects 
of involvement and complexity, while significant, were not consistent 
with the Involvement and Complexity hypotheses. 
Interpersonal Communication 
~n exploratory aspect of this study was the effect of making 
I 
differential causal attributions upon the nature of observers' inter-
personal communioa. tion with the confedera. te actor. Analysis of the 
communication proceeded along dimensions of content and strategy. 
Content was of three kinds& negative reinforcement (messages expli-
citly disconfirming previous behavior), positive reinforcement 
(messages explicitly confirming previous behavior), and adoption 
(messages explicitly recommending new behavior). Strategy referred to 
whether or not the attempt to influence the actor was founded primarily 
upon causative factors inherent in the actor's dispositions to behave 
(person) or upon causative fa.ctors inherent in circumstances (circum-
stances). Descriptive statements were also recorded, but were not 
analyzed as they did not bear upon the conte~t categories directly. 
In addition, the quantity of communication was also recorded and analyzed. 
A composite table of means appears in Table 18. The ubiquity of the 
effects of Relation and Complexity are interesting aspects of the analy-
sis. The following presentation will take up sepa.:ca.tely ea.ch of the 
communication categories cited above (except for description). 
Quantity. Quantity was affected only by a significant Relation 
x Complexity interaction (F=5.458, df=i,61, p=.023). Further analysis 
of relevant means (Table 19) revealed that low complex~ communicated 
more when they liked the actor than when they did not like the actor 
(F=10.827, df=1,61, p=.005). When.§.§. liked the actor, high complex Ss 
communicated more than low complex.§§. (F=4a019, df=1,61, p=.05)e Thus, 
while low complex observers communicate more to a liked actor than a 
disliked actor, high complex observers communicated more to the liked 
actor than low complex observers. 
Negative Reinforcement~ Behavior Ba.sad Jle2n, Personality. A 
main effect due to the actor's action was the ma.in predictor accounting 
for differences between.§.!. 1n directly demanding the cessation of the 
actor's behavior (F=iJ,633, df=i,61, p=.0005). Negative action (X= 
,675) accounted for more such attempts tha.n positive action (X=,025), 
Negative Reinforcement ~Behavior Based Upon Circumstances. The 
actor's behavior (Action) again presented a significant main effect 
(F=6,297, df=1, 61, p=,015). Negative action elicited more such negative 
reinforcement than did positive (.972 v •• 125). However, the effect 



















































Relation x Complexity 1 
High Low 
3.so A 5.52 
Not Like 4o22 2.75 
A 
1Mea.ns in the same row do not differ signi-
ficantly at .05 by the Tukey-B test if they 
share a co.mmon lower-case subscript. Those 
in the same column do not differ signifi-
cantly if they share a common upper-case 
subscript. 
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the cognitive complexity of the.§. (Relation x Action X Complexity: 
F=4o226, df=1,61, p=,044). Analysis of the group means (Table 20) 
revealed that high complex§.§. ma.de more such attempts than low complex 
Ss in the negative congruence condition (F=6.J29, df=1,61, p=Q025), 
high complex~ who were the recipients of positive action :ma.de more 
such attempts when they did not like the actor than when they liked 
him (F=8. 044, df=1, 61, p=. 025); that low complex §!. who liked the 
actor made more such attempts when the actor behaved negatively than 
when he behaved positively (F=S.740, df=1,61, p=.05); and high complex 
-
Ss who ,did not like the actor ma.de more such attempts when the actor 
behaved negatively than when he behaved positively (F=9,906, df=1,61, 
p=.005). 
It would appear that high complexity§.!, perhaps reflecting 
their naturally greater awareness of circumstantial factors, adopt the 
strategy of calling for the cessation of certs.in actor behaviors based 
upon the deleterious situational effects moreso than low complexity,§.§. 
when faced with a negatively congruent situation. In addition, high 
complexity§.§. adopt this strategy moreso when faced with a not like/ 
positive incongruency than when faced with positive congruence, and 
moreso when faced with negative congruence than not 11ke/po8)tive incon-
gruence. On the other hand, low complex§§. adopted the negative :rein-
forcement-person strategy more when faced with a like/negti,tive incon-
gruence than when faced with positive congruence. In this regard it 
is interesting to note that high complexity§!. adopted this strategy 
more when based upon circumstances tha.n when based upon the personc 
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high complexity Ss. In fact, low complexity.§§. only adopted this 
tactic to a significantly different degree when dealing with actors 
they liked. 
Positive Reinforcement .2!, Behavior Based Upon Personality. The 
analysis of this communication strategy showed a significant (F=18,703, 
df=1,61, p=.0005) main effect of Action(+ X=1.J25, - X= .243), signi-
ficant two-way interactions between Relation and Involvement (F=7,715, 
df=1,61, p=.007) and Action x Complexity (F=4.JOJ, df=1,61, p=e042), 
and a significant Relation x Action x Involvement x Complexity inter-
action (F=?.235, df=1,61, p=.009). 
As the four-wa.y interaction is difficult to interpret sensibly 
(Table 21), the significant two-way interactiolllwere analyzed separately, 
Analysis of the Relation x Involvement interaction (Table 22) 
indicated that when§.!. liked the actor, they ma.de more direct rein-
forcements of his behavior based upon the assumption of dispositional 
causation when they were passively involved than when they were actively 
involved (F=6.649, df=1,61, p=.025). When§§. were passively involved, 
they made more such reinforcements when they liked the actor than when 
they disliked the actor (F=6.J13, df=1,61, p=,025). 
Analysis of the Action x Complexity interaction (Ta.ble 23) 
indicated that high complexity~ made more personality-based rein-
forcements when exposed to positive behavior than when exposed to 
negative behavior (F•5,187, df=1,61, p•,05). 
Positive Reinforcement 2! Behavior Based Upon Circumstances. The 
only factor significantly influencing the§§,' tendency to use this 









High Low ' High Low 
Positive 1.00 1.00 3.25 1.20 
Aa Aa, It. Aa 
Negative .2.50 o.oo .333 .600 
Aa Aa a Aa 
Positive 2.20 1.00 .200 1.20 
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Aa Aa a, __ Aa 
1Mea.ns in the same row do not differ significantly at' 
.0.5 by the Tukey-B test if they share a common lower-
case subscript. Those in the same column do not differ 
if they share a common upper-case subscript. 
Table 22 
Reinforcement-Personality 
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Again, perhaps reflecting a greater awareness of circumstantial 
influences (or at least the advisability of a persuasive strategy 
based upon such). high complexity~ used this tactic more (X=.368) 
than low complexity Ss (X=,076), This result a.gain appears to point 
towards high complexity§§.. as being more aware of circumstantial 
factors or the advisability of circumstances-based appeals. 
Adoption of Behavior Based Upon Personality, Analysis of this 
communication factor showed two significant two-way interactions: 
Relation x Involvement (F=9.676, df=1,61, p=.OOJ) a~ Relation x 
Complexity (F=B.343. df=i,61, p=.005). 
Investigation of the Relation x Involvement interaction (Ta.ble 
24) indicated that Ss actively involved with an actor they like make 
more direct suggestions for the adoption of new behavior than when they 
are actively involved with an actor they do not like (F=i0.595, df=i,61 1 
p=.005). Ss actively involved with an actor they like make more such 
suggestions than when passively involved with an acto~ they like (F=4.570, 
df=1,61, p=,05), And§§.. passively involved with an actor they do not 
like use this strategy more tha.n when actively involved with an actor 
they do not like (F=S.945, df=1,61, p=.025), It is clear that the more 
intensely an observer is involved with an actor they likei the more 
likely it is that they will directly suggest the adoption of new beha-
viors; moreso when int~nsely involved with an actor they dislike. On 
the other hand, the less intensely involved. they are with an actor they 
do not like, the more likely it is tha.t they will make such suggestions. 
Investigation of the Relation x Complexity interaction (Table 
I 
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same column do not differ significantly if they 
share a common upper-case subscript. 
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dealing with a liked actor than a disliked actor (F-=8.203, df=!,61, 
p=.01) and that when dealing with a liked actor only, low complexity 
Ss used this strategy more than high complexity 2§. (F=S.895, df=1,61, 
p=.025). 
Adoption of Behavior Based .2!l Circumstances. Analysis of this 
communication factor only showed one significant interaction: Relation 
x Involvement (F=9,562, df=i,61, p=.OOJ). Investigation of the inter-
action revealed that actively involved§.§. make more suggestions for 
the adoption of new behavior based upon situational constraints, condi-
tions and effects when dealing with an actor they like, rather than one 
they dislike (F=15,893, d.f=1,61, p=o001), And when dealing with an 
actor they like, actively involved Ss make more such indirect sugges-
tions than do passively involved§§. (F=9.653, df=1,61, p=,005), The 
mean scores are summarized in Table 26. It is clear that the more 
' 
intensely observers are involved with actors they like, the more likely 
they are to use such a strategy; moreso when intensely involved with an 
actor they do not likeo 
Summa.r;y of~ Communicatic,n Invest1.ga.tion 
Since the study of communication was exploratory in na.ture 1 no 
hypotheses had been advanced. The quantity of the messages sent to the 
actor by observers appeared to be a function of§§.' cognitive complexity 
and their degree of liking for the actor. Attempts to directly stop 
unwanted behavior was a function mainly of the nature of the actor's 
behavior. Attempts to stop unwanted behavior supported by the,oitation 
of situational factors appeared to be a function of cognitive complexity 
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reinforcement o:f' behavior inferred to be the result of the target 
actor's disposition was a highly complex phenomenon, no doubt involving 
the processing of i~formation untapped by the communication measure. 
The positive reinforcement of behavior based upon circumstances was a 
function only of Ss' cognitive complexity~ The ubiquity of complexity 
in terms of significant effects upon communication strategies suggests 
that there ma.y be qualitatively different evaluative perspectives of 
appropriate communication strategies between high and'low complexity 
individuals. This tendency might well be a function of the differences 
in ability to appropriate, accept, a.ad construe information more flexibly 
by the cognitively complex person as compared to the non-complex person. 
The tactic of directly suggesting the adoption of new behavior 
was a function of interactions between Relation and Involvement, and 
Relation and Complexity. It would appear that both the intensity of 
involvement and cognitive ability affect an individual's choice of this 
strategy in dealing with liked and disliked others. Likewise, the 
tactic of supporting suggested change with situational data. was a. 
function of degree of lilting and degree of involvement with the actor, 
SUM.MARY 
This study found tha.t there was an overall tendency for both 
actively and passively involved observers to demonstrate attributional 
tendencies and patterns tha.t correspond to balance predictions. With 
one exception, observers faced with incongruent situations ma.de primarily 
external (circumstantial) attributions; while observers faced with 
congruent situations ma.de prima.rily internal (dispositional) attribu-




However, in terms of ,causal ascriptions to individual ca.usa.l loci, 
the balance predictions were not completely supported -- the loci of 
motivation and other persons not offering direct supporto It was clear 
that the use of each of these areas (personality, ciroumsta.noes, mood, 
motivation, and other persons) a.s singular causal explanations was sub-
ject to a variety of influences, much as though ea.ch had semi-unique 
judgment criteria.e The analysis of these five loci offered no direct 
support for the involvement predictions. 
Of the four independent variables, only Relation a.nd Action 
demonstrated significant ma.in effects -- external-1ntema.l attribution 
scale and circumstances, respectievly. All four factors were involved 
in a. variety of significant interactions: Re~ tion in persona.li ty, 
circumstances, mood, a.nd the internal-external sea.le; Action in person--
a.lity, circumstances, mood, motivation, other persons, a.nd the interna.1-
externa.l sea.le; Involvement in personality, mood, motivation, other 
persons, and the externa.1-interna.l sea.lei and Complexity in personality, 
motivation, other persons, and the interna.1-external scale. Only Rela.-
and Action were significant for the analysis of attributional patterns. 
In terms of communication from. observer to actor, all four 
factors influenced the content a.nd strategy of the messages. The 
effects of complexity and involvement upon the strategy chosen appeared 
to be the most significant interactions, although Action wa.s the ma.in 
predictor of the negative reinforcement-personality stra.tegyo 
CHAPI'ER DI 
DISCUSSION 
In this chapter the results will be elaborated and construed. 
Implications for theory and suggestions for future research will also 
be included. 
Findings About the Hzyotheses 
Ba.lance 
In general, the balance hypothesis l-l&S supported. Differences 
in the overall pattern of observers' attributio.ns were mainly a 
function of the congruency or incongruency of the actor's behavior 
with the relation between observers and actor. Observers in the like/ 
positive condition made prima.rily internal attributions; while observers 
in the likefnegative and the not like/positive conditions ma.de pri-
marily external attributions. The exception l-l&S the behavior of the 
not like/negative groups (to be discussed below). 
Further investigation of the data. indicates tha.t this interpre-
tation, while valid, is too simplistic to completely explain the unique-
ness of ea.ch group's attributional patterns. It may not be a simple 
"fitting-togetherness" or "not fitting-togetherness" of elements in a 
person's cognitive configuration that accounts for his attributional 
tendency. Rather, as will be discussed below, the influence of social 
expectations ma.y have altered the attributional tendencies in a manner 
that, while generally predicted by and consistent with balance formu-
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1.a.tions, produced differential information processing outcomes. 
Attribution research is concerned with how available information 
is processed= the creation a.nd construction of causal explanations. In 
this experimental situation, individuals knew that the actor either 
liked or disliked them, held similar or dissimilar attitudes, and per-
' formed certain positive or negative actions. As a result of process-
ing this information, like/positive and not like/negative groups saw 
personality as a better explanation of the causes of the actor's 
behavior than did like/negative and not like/positive groups; while 
like/negative and not like/positive groups saw circumstances as a. 
better explanation than did like/positive and not like/negative groups. 
While these trends were not consistently significant, they become more 
understandable if one considers the constituent elements in ea.ch case, 
A derivation of the typical be.la.nee formulation indicates that 
two lines of attributional reasoning are involved. Liking a.nd disliking 
establish certain expectations a.bout future behavior. These expecta-
tions derive not only from personal i.nf'luences, but also from social 
norm influences. This la.st influence links expectations with behavior. 
There would appear to be socially defined norms about behavior 
[Ka.nouse & Hanson, 1971] such that positive behavior is expected; 
negative behavior, therefore, has a greater informa.tional content. 
The examination of the attributional activity of the four Relation x 
Action groups yields some consistency of results when viewed from 
this perspective, 
In the like/negative condition, behavior was unexpected. and 
negative. The negative behavior was so incongruent with expectations 
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both personal and social -- that resolution of the inconsistency 
emphasized highly circumstantial factors and greatly de-emphasized 
personality factors. Since the behavior deviated from both personal 
and social expectations, its information value was high. The resulting 
processing of information produced the largest difference between 
personality and circumstances of any of the groups, As a matter of 
fa.ct, circumstances differed significantly from all other causal loci. 
In the not like/positive condition, the behavior was incongruent 
with personal expectations, but congruent with social norm expectations. 
The resulting processing of information emphasized circumstances as 
primary causative factors, but certainly did not greatly de-emphasize 
personality factors. Some explanation had to be found for the expected-
ness and unexpectedness of the positive behavior, The low informational 
content of the socially expected positive behavior led to more of a 
balance between internal and external factors than in the former 
condition, In fact, there was no significant difference between 
personality and circumstances for this group, 
In the like/positive condition, the positive behavior was 
expected both personally a.nd socially. While personality was empha-
sized more than circumstances, there was no significant difference 
between them. This suggests that complete congruence of behavior with 
expectations, especially social expectations, yielded little unique 
information, Ss, therefore, were not completely confident of the 
cause of this behavior, It was not out of the ordinary, especially 
in terms of expected social norms. 
In the not like/nega.tive condition., behavior was congruent with 
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personal expectations, but not with social norm expectations. This 
condition produced the smallest difference between personality and 
circumstances, both were seen as equally strong influencing factors. 
In fact, this condition showed a reversal of the balancing tendencies 
seen in the other three groups. This is the most puzzling result 
obtained, as one would expect an emphasis of personality factors and 
a de-emphasis of circumstantial factors. Explanation of this result 
proceeds a.long two lines. 
First, Newcomb [1968] ha.a proposed that in POX situations where 
the P/0 relation is negative, Ps will tend, though not invariably, to 
"disengage" themselves from the triadic relationship. Disengagement 
does not mean noninvolvement, but rather a state of little or no 
preference for ba.lance or imbaJ.ance. Thus, if P/0 is negative, there 
is typically much uncertainty in P's judgments. Consequently, Newcomb 
maintained, balance effects work only for liked others and not neces-
sarily for disliked others. This would appear to be the case for the 
not like/negative group's almost equal stress upon personality and 
circumstances as factors ca.using the actor's behavior, It does not, 
however, explain the other not like condition (not like/positive). 
In the latter instances, however, there was a socially expected posi-
tive behavior that, as discussed above, influenced Ss' attributions. -
Second, given that individuals appear to be more tentative in 
their causal attributions when they dislike the originator of negative 
behavior, there would appear to have been a unique personality x 
circumstances causal ascription by§!. in the not like/negative condition, 
These§§. were significantly higher than a.11 other groups in the use of 
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the other persons factor as a causal explanation of the actor's beha-
vior" In essence the reasoning would appear to be '*disliked persons 
cause him to act negatively." While theoretically an external factor, 
this causal locus, a.s used by these Ss, indicates the dual importance 
placed on personality and circumstances reflects a.n interaction bet-
ween internal and external factors. It is interesting to note that 
Ss in the like/positive condition did not emphasize other persons to as 
great an extent as did.§!!. in the not like/negative condition~ Since 
the positive behavior in the former condition was both so personally 
and socially expected, there may have been some doubt as to whether 
other persons was a significant causa. ti ve factor 01.· note 
Thus, the disengaging influence of the not llke relation, 
coupled with clear evidence of socially unexpected negative behavior~ 
led.§§. in this condition to employ personality and circumstances as 
equally significant causal factors, while also greatly emphasizing the 
other persons locus as an explanation for the negative behavior~ 
Therefore, if the salient balance-derived elements are considered, 
the modes of information processing employed by the different experi= 
mental groups become understandable and consistent with the main 
be.lance predictions. Within the ba.lance framework, it would appear 
that expected behaviors yield more dispositional attributions than 
unexpected behaviors, and in addition, positive behaviors yield more 
dispositional causal expla.na.tions than negative beha.viorse In terms of 
external attributions, unexpected behaviors yield more than expected, 
and negative behaviors yield more than positive. 
There a.re two other causal loci that demand attention. First, 
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it appears that all groups placed relatively small emphasis on causal 
ascriptions to mood. This la.ck of use suggests tha.t a minimWll of mood-
relevant information may have to be available before attributions to 
mood are made. Since§§. had not known the actor long enough to acquire 
any mood-relevant data, the factor was not salient. Circumstances 
more than likely picked up many incipient "mOod" attributions. 
Second, the attributions to motivation were not as predicted. 
However, the dif"ferentia.l interpretations tha.t Ss' gave to motivation 
can explain the unexpected results. 
A check of.§§.' verbal explanations of the actor's behavior 
(see "Information Processing" questionnaire, page 4, Appendix F) 
revealed that the experimental groups differed in their interpreta-
tion of motivation. The like/positive and not like/negative groups 
appeared to have interpreted motivation as essentially an internal, 
dispositional factor, as it was intended a.nd explained on the dependent 
measure form. 3 On the other ha.nd, .§J! in the like/negative and not like/ 
positive conditions appeared to have interpreted this category as an 
circumstantial, external factor. Typical verbal explanations cited 
"competitiveness" or the "desire to succeed" as underlying motivations, 
but also strongly emphasized the nature of the experimental task 
situation a.s the main influence on the mode of behavior that the appear-
ance of the motive took. The explicit implication was that in other 
situations the actor might not have behaved in this particular manner. 
As an intemal causal loais,motivation should have displayed the 
same basic pattern as personality. Had .§§. not construed motivation as 
an essentially external, oircumstantia.l factor, like/negative and not 
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like/positive groups may have been lower than like/positive and not 
like/negative groups, rather than vice versa as it was. 
Overall it is concluded that Ss behaved in accord.a.nee with the 
balance predictions. Inconsistencies in the individual group's results 
appear to be consistent with the balance hypothesis when constituent 
elements are examined more closely. The information processing modes 
of each group depended not only on a stra.in towards balance~ but also 
upon other attributional tendencies, primarily social expectations. 
Involvement and Complexity 
Involvement. In general, the involvement hypothese were not 
supported. Differential levels of interdependent involvement did not 
affect the attributional pattern of the experimental groups. However, 
in terms of attributions to mood, there was some confirmation of the 
hypothesis. In negatively congruent conditions, actively involved 
(interdependent) observers were more dispositional in their causal 
attributions than passively involved observers. 
Other than this single instance, there was no support for the 
predictions. And it is also clear tr..at there was no support for either 
the asswnptions that Jones and Nisbett or Kelley had advanced about the 
effects of involvement. There were clear differences in the attribu-
tions of actively and passively involved observers, contrary to the 
Jones and Nisbett assertion. At the same time, there wa.s no evidence 
to support Kelley's thesis that actively involved observers will attri-
bute positive actions to themselves ~nd negative actions to the actor. 
Involvement did affect observers' causal attributionse but only 
in interaction with complexity and relation, or complexity and action 
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(with the exception of mood attributions)o These interactions will be 
discussed below under Involvement x Complexityo 
Complexity. In general, the complexity hypothesis was not 
supported. Differential levels of cognitive complexity did not affect 
the overall attributional pattern of the experL~enta.l g-roups. Complexity 
did affect attributions to specific loci, but only in interaction with 
involvement and action, or involvement and relation. These effects 
will be discussed below. 
Involvement .2i. Complexity. While there were no main effects due 
to either complexity or involvement, there were significant interactions 
between these factors, The evidence was confusing and deserves further 
research; still, some tentative observations can be ma.de. 
First, active (interdependent) involvement tends to produce a 
"negativity" effect when compared to passive involvement. High' 
complexity observers saw negative behavior as more internally caused 
when actively involved than when passively involved. Low complexity 
observers saw the behavior of actors they did not like (and who 
disliked them) as more internally ca.used when actively involved than 
when passively involved. 
Second, active involvement tended to increase the tendency for 
both high and low complexity observers to see the behavior of actors 
they disliked (and who disliked them) as more internally caused than 
t~e behavior of actors they lilted (and who liked them). 
Third, active involvement tended to produce a "positivity" 
effect for low complexity observers, They saw positive behavior as 
more internally caused than negative behavior. 
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Fourth, passive involvement produced a .. negativity'' effect 
among high complexity observers, They saw the behavior of actors they 
disliked as more internally caused than ~he behavior of liked actors. 
Fifth, passive involvement tended to influence high complexity 
observers to see the behavior of disliked actors and positive behavior 
as more internally caused, and the behavior of liked actors as less 
internally caused than did low complexity observers. 
One must be cautious in generalizing this data~ These effects 
did not appear in the analysis of the overall attributional tendencies 
of the experimental groups, In additionj the passively involved 
observers did not correspond to the typical uninvolved observer most 
often discussed in the actor-observer literaturee These observers did 
have information about the environment and circumstances, did have 
some information about the actively involved observers, and possessed 
a great deal of data about the actor himself, But, in general, with 
one exception, these results substan·t.iate the findings of Rosenbach, 
Crockett and Wapner [1973] as to the effects of emotional involvement 
upon the level of cognitive functioning. The assumption of internal 
causality was most clearly a function of negative behavior or rela-
tionshipo Rosenbach, ll al [1973] noted that the decrease in the level 
of cognitive functioning was greater for negative involvement than for 
positive involvement, It is interesting to note in this regard that 
the "negativity" effect for high complexity individuals appeared to 
be a function of the behavior when moving across levels of involve-
ment, while for low complexity persoas the effect appeared to be a 
function of the interpersonal relationship, Therefore, it would appear 
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that the attenuating effects upon cognitive complexity of negative 
involvement may be increased by negative actions as opposed to negative 
relationships. However, this can only be a tentative explanation in as 
much as among high complexity.§§. who were actively (interdependently) 
involved, the behavior of those actors they disliked was seen as more 
internally caused than the behavior of actors they liked. This de~ia-
tion may be attributed to the fact that the information that the actor 
disliked them may have held greater informational and inferential 
energy since it was based upon a relatively small amount of data and 
contactc The fact that the actor ex-pressed a socially unexpected and 
informationally ''unreasonable 18 dislike of them may have been so potent 
as to merit their internal causation assumptiono 
One puzzling result remains the tendency of high complexity 
observers in the passive involvement condition to operate apparently 
on the basis of the simplifying assumption that behavior or relation 
is directly indicative of internal dispositions. The attentuation of 
complexity predicted in the active involvement condition should not 
thus appear in the passive involvement condition. While replications 
may clarify ·the confusion~ a tenta. ti ve explanation can be advanced. 
The explanation cited above for the extreme informational relevancy of 
disliking may explain the tendency of high complexity individuals to 
see the behavior of those they dislike (and who dislike them) as more 
internally caused than low complexity individuals. In fact, when the 
relationship was reversed (like), and., presumably, the informational 
content decreased, the trend was reversed. The additional finding, 
that positive behavior wa.s seen as more intemally caused by highs 
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than by lows when passively involved, may simply indicate that both 
low and high complexity persons are subject to a positivity effect --
as were lows in the active condition, such that positive behavior is 
attributed more to persons than is negative behavior. 
Theoretical Implications and Suggestions £2!, Future Research 
The processes involved in making causal at~ributions are clearly 
complex. Persons must att,end to available information and process this 
data to arrive at a satisfactorily coherent explanation of behavior. 
One attributional ::paradigm is that observers will form causal expla• 
nations of an actor's behavior that reflect primarily reliance on 
internal, dispositional elements. This study was designed to identify 
any systematic and predictable differences in-the attributional , 
processes of observers based upon factors of differential involvement, 
differential cognitive complexity, and the psychological strain towards 
balance. 
Results tend to indicate that the contention that the acquisi-
tion of a balanced perceptual configuration functions as a criterion of 1 
attributional sufficiency is, itself, not sufficient to explain the 
observed phenomena.. It may be true, as Kelley [1971a] asserted, that 
balance is simply one of many causal schemata by which causally rele-
vant information is processed. The strain towards balance was not an 
equally compelling force for individuals in this studyo It is clear 
that other causal schema.ta., such a.s a social expectation matrix, also 
played a. role in information processing. But it clear that observers 
do differ in their attributional tendencies. They do not behave 
consistently in accordance with the predictions of the actor-observer 
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paradigm, 
Future research should attem:pt to establish the parameters of 
the range of applicability and use of causal schemata. such as balancem 
Under conditions of low acquaintance, it appeared that balance wa.s most 
used in reference to liked actors. Under conditions of high acquain-
tance would this same effect hold? Previous research indicates that 
it probably would. However, would balance be more readily used in 
dealing with known disliked other than with relatively unknown disliked 
others as in this study? It would also be profitable to investigate 
the manners 1n which causal schema.ta interact. 
It is also patently clear that the manner in which the experi-
menter solicits data about attribution processeses affects the view 
given. A simple internal-external attributional scale may reflect 
general tendencies, but once one elaborates possible causal loci,' a 
different picture is painted, To a certain extent, the view of reality 
can be a function of the limitations or creativity of the dependent 
measuresa The results of this study ma.ke it clear that there are 
perhaps somewhat different attributional guides for each specified 
area of causality~ Individuals may use different inforn1ation processed 
in different modes in ascribing motivationalp mood, personality, etca 
causeso Future research should further investigate the causal modes 
and schemata that may be indiginous "to particular causal loci. 
The differences between actively (interdependently) and passively 
involved observers, and cognitively complex and non-complex observers 
found in this study clearly suggest that the interaction between them 
was more significant tha.n any :ma.in effectso Interdependce tended to 
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attenuate the effects of complexity. It would appear that a certain 
degree of detachment may be necessary for complex individuals to 
function at a normally high level. Is this same tendency retained 
when interdependently involved with a highly known other? Future 
research might conce~trate in this areae Does the complex person's 
tendency to integrate conflicting information by seeking underlying 
motivational explanations decrease when something personal at stake 
has been facilitated or inhibited by a liked or disliked other? More 
importantly, it must be realized that passive involvement in this 
study was not truely passive in terms of the actor-observer paradigm. 
If individuals are totally bereft of data about circUlllStances and the 
actor, will the effects of complexity be the same as found here? All 
of these can be lines of future research in terms of balance, as well 
as involvement and cognitive complexity. 
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Finally, the effects of differential attributions upon the 
content and st.rategy of interpersonal communication remains an area in 
need of future research. The data gathered in this study does give 
some tentative description of such effects~ But it is clear that there 
was not a direct relation between reported attributions and communica-
tion strategy adopted, There appeared to be general tendencies related 
to relationship and behavior, but none that bear out a direct tie to 
causal attributions. The effects of cognitive complexity were clearly 
evident in individual's choices of strategies. However, the exact 
nature of, processes tha.t ocurred betlieen attribution and subsequent 
communication are not cleara Another area of future research would 
' 
be the investigation of influences upon decisions to adopt one strategy 
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over another. While one may decide that a person's dispositions were 
quite clearly the ca.use of a particular behavior, the a.pproa.ch to 
changing tha.t behavior may rest upon more tha.n simply causal designa-
tions. The discovery of some of these intervening communication-
rela.ted factors may, in fact, shed more light upon the processes of 
causal attributions themselves. 
As usual, research, while a.nswering some questions, raises many 
more in the same process. Investigating the complex processes of human 
behavior only leads one to ma.rvel even more at the complexity itselfo 
An experiment,was performed to test the effects of strain towards 
ba.la.nce, involvement, and cognitive complexity upon the causal attribu-
tions observers would make about an actor. In a 24 fa.ctoria.l design, 
81 University of Ka.nsa.s underg:cadua.tes served as subjectse The experi-
mental sessions involved the ma.n1puls.tion of a like or cU,slike relation 
between subjects and a confederate actor by means of attitude sim1la.rity/ 
dissimilarity and revealed reciprocal liking or disliking. Subjects 
were then exposed to positive or negative behavior by the confederate 
actor with whom they were either passively or actively (interdependently) 
involved in a mutually contingent proble~-solving task. Subjects were 
then asked to record their attributions of the,causes of the actor's 
behavior in terms of internal or external causality, personality, 
circumstances, mood, motivation, and other persons. 
The congruence/incongruence of the actoi's behavior with observer-
actor relationship 1nfluenced the overall attributional pattern of the 
subjects. Essentially, those in congruent conditions made primarily 
93 
internal, dispositonal attributions, while subjects in incongruent 
situations made primarily external, circumstantial attributionse This 
result, however, was not consistent for all experimental groups, even 
though the Relation x Action interaction was the only significant factor 
affecting overall attributional patterns. Differential levels of 
involvement and complexity did not produce predicted resultso However, 
there appeared to be a lessening of complexity effects as involvement 
moved from passive to active. 
Subjects were also asked to communicate with the actor after 
the completion of the task so as to change his behavior a.s they saw 
advisable. There was no direct, obsez-vable relation between content 
and strategy of comrnunica.tion and the nature of prior causal attribu-
tions. There did appear to be effects due to relation and behavior, 
as well as ubiquitous effect due to cognitive complexity~ 
Three major conclusions were drawn, First, the attributional 
tendencies of observers do differ significantly from that predicted by 
the actor-observer paradigm. Second, the formation of causal attribu-
tions was significantly affected by a st.rain towa.rd.s balance. However, 
balance appeared to function as one of several relevant causal schema.ta, 
rather than a singular criterion of attributional sufficiencyo Third, 
the effects of cognitive complexity appear to be attenuated as involve-
ment (interdependence) with the o~ject person becomes higher, greater, 
and more intense. 
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SOCIAL PERCEPTION QUESTIO~'NAIRE 
Name Sex 
Our interest in this questionnaire is to learn how people describe 
others. We are interested in knowing, in your own terms, the characteristics 
which a set of individuals have--those which set one person off from another 
as an individual, and those characteristics which they share in common. 
Our concern here is with the habits, ideas, mannerisms -- in general, 
with the personal characteristics, rather than ~he physical traits -- which 
characterize a number of different people. 
In order to make sure that you are descrlbing real people., we have 
set down a list of two different categories of people. In the blank space 
beside each categor: below., please write the initials, nicknames, or some 
identifying symbol for a person of yeur acquaintance who fits that category. 
Be sure to use to use a different person ff)r each category. 
1. A person your own age and sex whom you like ____ _ 
2. A person your own age and sex whom you dislike ____ _ 
Spend a few moments looking over this list, mentally comparing and 
contrasting the people you have in mind for each category. Think of their 
habits, their beliefs, their mannerisms, their relations to others, any 
characteristics they have which you might use to describe them to other 
peopl<.. 
If you have any questions about the kinds of characteristics we are 
interested in, please ask them. 
Do not turn the page until instructed to do so. 
10; 
Please look back to the first sheet and place bhe symbol you 
have used to designate the,person in category 1 here _____ • 
Now describe this,,person as fully as you can. Write down as 
many defining characteristics as you cane Pay particular attention 
to his/her habits, beliefs, ways of treating others, mannerisms, and 
similar attributes. Remember, describe hiri./her as completely as you 
can, so that a stranger might be able to determine the kind of person 
he/she is from your description. Use the back of this page if 
necessary. 
This person is1 
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Please look back to the first sheet and place the symbol you 
have used to designate the person in cater,ory 2 here -----
Now describe this person as fully as you can. Write down as 
many defining characteristics as you can. Pay particular attention 
to his/her habits, beliefs, ways of treating others, mannerisms, and 
similar attributes. Remember, describe him/her as completely as you 
can, so that a stranger might be able to determine the kind of person 
he/she is from your descrjption. Use the back of this page if 
necessary. 
This person is g 
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MEMBER ATTITUim5 QUliSTIONNAIRE 
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I··•ame 
Please place a check in the blank besir1e the stateMent wliicfl most 
nearly expresses your opinion uith rerarc' to each topic listeci. 
1. Fraternities and Sororities (Check One) 
I am very much against fraternities and sororities as they 
-usually function. 
I am against fraternities and sororities~as they usually 
-function. 
_To a slight degree, I am against fraternities and sororities 
as they usually function. 
To a slight degree, I am in favor of fraternities and 
--sororities as they usually function. 
I am in favor of fraternities and sororities as they usually 
--function. 
I am very much in favor of fraternities and sororities as 
--they usually function. 
2. Integration in Public Schools (Check one) 
Racial integration in public schools is a mistake, and I 
--am very much against it. 
__ Racial integration in public schools is a mistake, and I 
am against it. 
Racial integration in public schools is a mistake, and I 
--am mildly aganist it. 
Racial integration in public schools is a good plan, and 
--I am mildly in favor of it. 
__ Racial integration in public schools is a good plan, and -
I am in favor of it. 
__ Racial integration in public schools is a good plBn# and 
I am very much in favor of it, 
3. Premarital Sex (Check one) 
In general, I am very much in favor of premarital sex. 
--In general, I am nn favor of premarital sex. 
--In general, I am mildly in favor of premarital sex. 
-In general, I am mildly against premarital sex. 
-In general, I am against premarital sex. 
In general, I am very much against premarital sex. 
4. Classical Music (Check one) 
I dislike classical music very much. 
I dislike classical music. 
--I dislike classical music to a slight degree. 
I enjoy classical music to a slight degree. 
--I enjoy classical music, 
I enjoy classical music very much. 
s. The home provides adequate outlets for a woman's creative and 
intellectual expression -- she need not look outside the home. 
(Check cne) 
__ I strongly agree with the abnve statement. 
__ I agree with the above statement. 
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5. I slightly agree with the Gbove statement. 
-I slightly disagree with the above statement. 
-I disagree with the above statement. 
-I strongly disagree with the above statement. 
6. Drinking (Check one) 
In general, I am v~ much in favor of college students 
-dTinking alcoholic beverages. 
__ In general, I am in favor of college students drinking 
alcoholic beverages. 
In general, I am mildly in favor of college students 
-drinking alc~holio beverages. 
In general, I am mildly opposed to college students 
-drinking alcoholic beverages, 
In general, I am opposed to oollefe students drinking 
-alcoholic beverages. 
In general, I am very much opposed to .-.o1 lege &tuclents 
-drinking alcoholic beverages. 













am very much in favor of smoking marijuana. 
am i.n fav-,r of smoking marijuana. 
am mildly in favor of smoking marijuana. 
am mildly against smoking marijuana. 
am against smoking marijuana. 
am v~ much against smoking marijuana, 
8. American Way of Life (Check One) 
I strongly believe that the American way of life is not the best. 
I believe that the American way of life is not the best. 
-I feel that perhaps the American way of life is nQt the best, 
-1 feel that perhaps the American way of life is the best:. 
-I believe that the American way of life is the best. 
-I strongly believe that the American way of life is the best. 
9. The dom~stic duties in a household are the primary responsibility 
of the wife and mother, (Check Qlle) 
I sttongly agree with the above statement~ 
-I agree with the above statement. 
-I slightly agree with the above statement. 
-I slightly disagree with the above statement. 
-I disagree with the above statement. 
-I strongly disagree with the above statement. 
10, Preparedness for War (Check one) 
I strongly believe that preparedness for war will not tend 
-to precipitate war, 
I believe that pr~-pareoness for war will not tend to preci-
-pitate war. 
I feel that perhaps preparedness for war will not tend to 
-precipitate war. 
I feel that perhaps preparedness for war will tend to 
-precipitate war, 
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10. __ I believe that preparedness for war will tend to preci-
pitate war. 
_I strongly believe that preparedness for war will tend to 
precipitate war. 
11. Legalizing Marijuana (Check one) 
In general, I am very much in favor of legalizing mar1Juana. 
In general, I am in favor of legalizing marijuana. 
--In general, I am mildly in favor of legalizing marijuana. 
--In general, I am against legalizing mar~juana. 
-In general, I am against legalizing mariju.:Lna. 
-In general, I am very much against legalizing marijuana. 
12. Welfare (Check one) 
I am very much opposed to increased welfare legislation. 
--I am opposed to increased welfare legislation. 
--I am mildly opposed to increased welfare legislation. 
--I am mildly in favor of increased welfare legislation. 
-I am in favor of increased welfare legislation. 
--I am very much in favor of increased welfare legislation. 
13. Strict Discipline (Check one) 
I am very much against strict disciplining of children. 
I am against strict disciplining of children. 
--I am mildly against strict disciplining of children. 
--I am mildly in favor of strict disciplining of children. 
--I am in favor of strict disciplining of children. 
-I am very much in favor of strict disciplining of children. 
14. A Volunteer Army Instead of a Draft (Check one) 
I am very much in favor of a volunteer army. 
--I am in favor of a volunteer army. 
--I am mildly in favor of a volunteer army. 
-I am mildly opposed to a volunteer army, 
--I am opposed to a volunteer army. 
--I am very much opp~sed to a volunteer army. 
15. The woman's role in contemporary society needs to be redefined. 
(Check one) 
I strongly agree with the above statement" 
-I agree with the above statement. 
I slightly agree with the above statement. 
--I slightly disagree with the above statement. 
--I disagree with the above statement. 
--I strongly disagree with the above statement. 
16. Abortion (Check one) 
_I strongly support the right of a woman to obtain an abortion 
if she so desires. 
__ I support the right of a woman to obtain an abortion if she 
so desires. -
_J slightly support the right of a woman to obtain an abortion 
if she so desires. 
I am---s-lightly against a woman obtaining an abortion if her 
-iue is not in danger. 
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16. I am against a woman obtaining an abortion if heT life is 
---not in danger. 
I am strongly against a woman obtaining an abortion if her 
--life is not in danger. 
17. Professor and Student Needs (Check one) 
I feel that university professors are 
-to student needs. 
completely indifferent 
I .feel that university 
-needs. 
professors are indifferent to student 
_I feel that university professors are slightly indifferent 
to student needs. 
_._I feel that university professors are slightly concerned 
about student needs. 
I feel that university professors are concerned about student 
-needso 
I feel that university professors are very concerned about 
student needs. 
18, Limiting Population Growth (Check one) 
I strongly believe that couples should limit themselves to 
-two children. 
I believe that couples should limit themselves to two 
-children, 
I feel that perhaps couples should limit thems~lves to two 
--children. 
I feel that perhaps couples should feel free to have more 
-than two children. 
I believe that couples should feel free to have more than 
-two children. 
I strongly believe that couples should feel free to have 
-more than two children, 
19. Money (Check one) 
I strongly believe that money is not ene of the most impor-
-tant goals in life. 
I believe that m~ney is not one of t0e most important goals 
--in life, 
I feel that perhaps money is not one of the most important 
--goals in life, 
I feel that perhaps money is one of the most important goals 
--in life. 
I believe that money is one of the most important goals in 
-life. 
I strongly believe that money is one of the most important 
-goals in life. 
20. Political 3eliefs (Check one) 
I am very conservative in my political beliefs. 
--I am conservative in my political beliefs. 
--I am slightly conservative in my political beliefs. 
-I am slightly liberal in my political beliefs. 
-I am liberal in my politinal beliefs. 
--I am very liberal in my political beliefs. 
APPENDDC D 
INTERPERSONAL JUDGMENT SCALE 
INTERPERSONAL JUDGMENT SCALE 
Name: _______________ _ 
Reaoti~n to:, _______________ _ 
1. Intelligence (Check one) 
I believe that this person is very much above average in 
-intelligence. 
_I believe that this person is above average in intelli-
gence. 
I believe that-thi.s _pe,scn is-slightly above average in 
-intelligence. 
I .be.1ieve that this person is average in intelligence. 
-I believe that this person is slightly be.low average in-
-intelligence. 
_I believe- that this person is below average in intelli-
gence. 
__}. -believe-that--"this person-is ve:y much bel:ow---average-in' 
intelligence. 
2. Knowledge of Current Events (Check one) 
I believe that this person is very JIIJCh below average in 
-his ~her) knowledge of ourrent events. 
_I believe that this person is below average in his (her) 
knowledge of current events. 
_I believe-that this person is slightly below-average in 
- his (her) knowledge of ourrent events. ' 
__J. believe that this person is average-in bis (her) know-
ledge of current events. 
I believe that this person is slightly above average in 
-his (her) knowledge of current events, 
I believe that this person is above average in his (her) 
-knowledge of current events. 
__J. believe that this person is very much above.average in 
his (her) knowledge of current events. 
3. Morality (Check one) 
This person impresses me as being extremely moral, 
-This person impresses me as being moral. 
-This person impresses me as being moral to a slight degree. 
-This person impresses me as being neither pat·t:icularly moral 
-nor particularly immoral, · 
This person impresses me as being immoral to a slight degree. 
This person impresses me as being immoral. 
_Thi.s person~impresses me as being extremely immoral. 
4, Adjustment (Check one) 
_I believe that this person is extremely maladjusted. 
_I believe that this person is maladjusted. 
_I believe that this person is maladjusted to a slight degree. 
_I believe that this person is neither partioularly maladjusted 
nor particularly well adjusted. 
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4. I believe that this person is well adjusted to~ slight 
-degree. 
I believe that this person is well adjusted. 
-I believe that this person is extremely well adjusted. 
s. Personal Feelings (Che~k one) 
I feel that I would probably like this pe.rGon very much. 
-I feel that I would probably like this person. 
-I feel that I would probably like this pcr~on to a slight 
-degree. 
I feel that I would probably neither pa:rtJ.t•ularly like nor 
-particularly dislike this person. 
I feel that I would probably dislike this person to a slight 
-degree. 
I feel that I would probably dislike this person. 
I feel that I would probably dislike this person very much. 
6. Working Together in an Experiment (Check one) 
I believe that I would very much dislike working with this 
-person in an experiment. 
_I believe that I would dislike working with this person in 
an expe-riment. 
I believe that I would dislike working with this person in 
-an experiment to a slight degree. 
I believe that I would neither particularly dislike nm: 
-particularly ebjoy working with this person in an expe,:iment. 
_I believe that I would enjoy wor.king with th:i.s person in an 
experiment to a slight degree. 
__J. believe that I would enjoy working with this p<?"•:-son in an 
experiment. 







Here is the first onea Good luck. 
Correct. Good job. Try #2. 
Right: You're making good time, Here's 
the third one. 
Cor..cect again, Get this one and you-ire 
over halfway done. 
Correct: You're really good at thiso Try #So 
Right, Good work. Here's the 6th one. 
RightJ Here's the la.st one. Good lucko 
I'm sorry, but that's not right, Try again --
I know you oa.n get it. 
Sorry, but that's not right either. It's 
tough, but give it another try. Good luck, 
--- time expires ---
Message 
Here's the first onee 
Correcto Here's #2. 
NEGATIVE COMMUNICATION 
OK, but you're ta.king too much time, 
Speed it up on #3• 
It's a.bout time. Correct. Get a. move ono 
Come on, what's holding you up? 
Fina.Uy: Even though you got it right you 
are using way too much time. Get going on 
this oneo 
Right, but go faster. Bear down: 
OK. Here's the la.st one, but try not to 
use so much time on this one. 
WRONG -- you have wasted a lot of time but 
you might a.a.well keep working till you get 
it right. 
Wrong again. Try again, but you don't ha.ve 
much time left. 




















































We are now interested in how information about members of 
networks gets transferred and processed in this particular 
kind of network. In order to get some reading on this, 
please fill out the following questionnaire in reference 
to: -------------· 
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We have listed below five kinds of expla,na.tions for a person's behavior. 
Different people account for another's behavior in different ways. 
Please read the explanations below and decide which explanations 
you prefer for explaining and understanding the behavior of _____ • 
In the space to the left of the explanations, give each explanation 
a rating from Oto 100 according to how good you think it is. If 
you think an explanation would provide an extremely poor way of 
accounting for his/her behavior, put a O in the blank to the left. 
If you think it would provide a means for accounting for his/her 
behavior that is somewhere between extremely poor and excellent, 
choose some appropriate number; for example, if you think the expla-
nation is neither goor bad, put a rating of 50 in the blank to 
the left of that explanation. If you think an explanation would 
provide an excellent way of accounting fer his/her behavior, put a 
100 in the blank to the left of the explanation. 
Remember, you are filling this questi•nnaire out in reference to 
----------· 
Rating (from 
0 to 100) 
Rank Order 
(from 1 to 5) 
_______ AG Personality explanatien. he/she typically ______ _ 
acts in these ways because of specific 
qualities or aspects of him/her as a person. 
This is the type of person he/she is. ' 
_______ Q• Explanation based on ciroumstance. He/~he ______ _ 
acts in these waysbecause of the parti-
cular ciroumstances. SQmething about the 
external circumstances caused him/her to 
act in this way. 
_______ c. explanatien. fie/she acts in these~ 
ways because of a te111pC'1:8W mood ( or some 
temporary state) that he/she is in fLt this 
partii:'.ular time. 
_______ D .. -Motivati.nal explanation .. He/she acts in 
J - --these ways because he/ she has certain needs, 
wants, desires that motivate their actions. 
That is, there is some underlying motiva-
tional state that leads him/her to act in 
these ways. 
_______ ,E. Explanations based ..2!!., other 12erson. He/~:-; _____ _ 
she acts in these ways because he]she 
behaves differently to different-types 
of peDSons. That is, the type of person 
they are with oauses them to act differ-
ently. 
After you have rated al-1 five--exp-1.a.nations, g,f) back and rank them in 
the oroer you prefer, using the blank to the right of the explanation. 
That is, place the number 1 after the explanation you Jnost prefer, the 
number 2 after the explanation you prefer second best, the number 3 
after the explanation you prefer third best, the number 4 after the 
eJeplana-t-i-on-you-prier-.f'.tt\.11'-t-h-bes-t-,-ana-t-he-number-5-af-ter-the_exp_lana:: 
tion vou least nr~TPr-
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A person's actions can be seen to be caused either by the pressures and 
expectations in the situation that he or she is involved in or by under-
lying characteristics of the person involved. If you had to make a choice, 
































An important aspect of communication in different kinds of organi-
zational networks is how some members see other members and their 
behavior. Cf special interest are the explanations members have of 
other members' behavior. In the space provi0ed ~elow please write 
out tbe explanation(s) you prefer for explaining ~nd understanding 
the behavior of ________ • Please describe you explanation 
as fully and completely as you can. Use the back of this sheet if 
necessary. 
:t22. 
INTERPERSONAL JUDGMENT SCALE 
Name: --------------
Reactilm to: -----------------
1. Intelligence (Check one) 
I believe that this person is very much above average in 
-intelligence. 
_I believe that this person is above average in intelli-
gence. 
I believe ~is __pepscn -i.s--slightly- above average in 
-intel.-ligence. 
I...l>elieve that this person is average in intelligence. , 
-I believe that this person is slightly below·average_in-
-intelligence. 
_I believe·that...this person-is-below average in, intelli-
gence. 
__J.-believe-that-this person.,."is very tnuch~· 
·intelligence. 
2. Knowledge of Current Events (Check one) 
I believe that this person is yeey much pelow.4 avera.ge in 
-his (her) kn<>wledge of current events., 
_I believe that this person is below average in his {her) 
knowledge of ourrent events. 
I be-lteve-that this person is slightly below----average .in 
---his (her) knowledge of ourrent events. ' 
I believe that this- -person is av~-age-in his (her) know-
-ledge of current events. 
I believ~ that this 38rson is slightly abovP average in 
-his (her) knowledge ~f current events. 
I believe that this person is above average in his (her) 
-know1edge of current events, 
I believe that this pet"son is very much above..,av.erage in 
-his (her) knowledge of current. events. 
3 • Morality ( Check one) 
This person impresses me as being extremely moral, 
-This person impresses me as being moral. 
This person impresses- -me as being moral to a slight degree. 
This person impresses me as being .neither particularly moral 
-ner particularly immoral. " 
_This person impresses me as bein~ immoral to a slight degree. 
_This person impresses me as being immoral. 
_This person-impresses me as ~beµig-extternely immoral. 
4. Adjustment (Check one) 
_J. believe that this pers.on is extremely maladjusted. 
__J. believe that this person is maladjusted. 
_I believe that this person is maladjus-ted to a slight degree. 
_I believe that this person is nei.ther parti(,ularly maladjusted 
nor particularly well adjusted. 
4. I believe that tl11.s person is well ad juf'te:d to a slight 
degree. 
_I believe that this person is well adjusted. 
I believe that - this person is extremely well adjusted. 
s. Personal Feelings (Check one) 
I feel that I w&uld probably like this person very much. 
-I feel that I would probably like this person. 
-I feel that I would probably like this person to a slight 
degree. 
I feel that I would probably neither particularly like nor 
--particularly dislike this person. 
__ I feel that I would probably dislike this person to a slight 
degr~e. 
I feel that I would probably dislike this person. 
I feel that I would probably dislike this person very much. 
6. Working Together in an Experiment (Check one) 
__ I believe that I would very much dislike working with this 
person in an experiment. 
I believe that I would dislike working with this person in 
--an experiment. 
I believe that I would dislike working with this person in 
- an experiment to a slight degree. 
I believe that I would neither particularly dislike nor 
--particularly eitjoy working with this person in an expet:i.mezit._ 
I believe that I would enjoy wor.kb1g with this person in an 
--experiment to a slight degree, 
I believe that I would enjoy working with this person in-an-
-experiment, 
I believe that I would yery lIIUCh enjor-working with this 
--perso~lment. 
APPENDIX G 
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?--TET'ACRK RECRGA:t-1IZATICF 
A communication network can change in several ways. Its 
shape can change so that members are in contact with different 
members. This is an °'external'' change. Cn the other hand, its 
shape can remain the same while the relations between the members 
change. This is an "internal" change. He are interested in such 
0 internal" changes in this network. Such things as how well the 
networlc has attained its geal, the satisfaction of the members in 
the network, and the nature of the interpersonal relations among the 
members all play a major role in "internal" changes. 
Many studies have reported that these "internal" changes 
usually take place when feedback is given te the central member(s) 
of the network by other members. And we have found that this feed-
back is most relevant if it is about certain items rather than others. 
The feedback i terns that are important- for "internal" changes are 
, listed on- the 9'Feedbaak Checklist" on the next page. 
In order to get some idea of how this network can change 
internally, yeu are to construct a message that will be sent to xhe 
central member(s) of this network (member {fl _____ ). In this 
message you may want tQ e.omment on items included in the "F~ecfback 
Checklist", 
Please read each item on the- "Feedback Checklist" ano 
respond according to the directions. 
When you have completed the "Feedback Checklist" go on 
to the next page. Here you will write out the message'you wish to 
send to the centraimember(s). The message will be the only item 
sent-to---him/her~-ymxr-''Feedback Cheeklist''-will not be sento 
12.5 
FEEr:AcF CnEC~LIST 
Enter the response that best represents your view. 
1. Problems chosen by the selector were~ 
9 nruch too easy 
8 
7 slightly too easy 
6 
5 about right 
4 
3 slightly too difficult 
2 
1 much too difficult 
Nember 1'lumber 
2. l'he-sel.ector~s- corrtri.bution·to the aocomplishment- of this task wasg 
------· 








1 low -- was not at all helpful 
3. The selector tended to create an interpersonal relationship with the"' 
problem-solver that was: -----









neither contributed to nor detracted from good teamwork 
and member satisfaction 
1 positive -- contributed to good teamwork and member satisfaction 
4. The manner in which the-selector-attempted to motivate the problem-
solver-was g _____ i 




5 neither especially appropriate and effective nor especially inappro- - _ 









Write out below the message you wish to send to the selector. 
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This tas~ involves the completion of a pattern of 
symbols arranged in a matrix, The goal is to select one of eight 
possibilities that wili be an appropriately correct completion of 
the pattern in the matrix. For instance, in the matrix below one 

















There are 100 possible problems. The task is to complete seven(7) 
in fifteen(lS) minutes. The problems range in oifficulty from•~" 
(very easy) to "too••(very difficult). The range of difficulty for 
all problems is= 1-35 small difficulty 
36-70 medium cifficulty 
71-100 extreme difficulty 
One member of the network will serve as the problem "Selector 0 , 
two will function as ''Problem-Solvers,., and two will be 110bservers". 
Each problem will be selected by a member of the network(the Selector) 
and sent to other members(the Problem-Solvers) for completion. The 
Selector may inclu~e with the problem any information he desires in 
the form of written messages. The Selector knows the correct answers 
fer each problem and will let the Problem-Solvers know whether they 
have correctly solved the problem or not. The Problem-Solvers may 
also communicate with the Selector if they so desire by means of 
written messa~es also. 
Those who are Cbservers in this task will receive all informa--
tion that is exchanged between the Selector and the Problem-Solvers. 
Cbservers are to keep a recore of the problems chosen, their diffi-
culty, whether they were completed correctly~ and arrange all 
messages in their correct temporal sequence. 
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PR0,,LEM-S0LVER 
As a Problem-Solver you are to complete each problem as 
it is sent to you by the selector. You have fifteen(lS) minutes 
to complete seven(7) problems. 11Jhen you have completed each pro-
blem you are to send your answer back to the Selector who will let 
you know if you answered correctly or incorrectly, If correct, 
the next problem will be sent to you. If incorrect, you are to 
keep working on the same problem until you answer it correctly. 
You may request any information you desire from the selector by 
means of written messages. Ee will reply as he chooses. 
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SELECTOR 
Your task is to make the assignment of problems to the problem solvers 
and to report to them if their answer is correct or incorrect. You have 
100 problems that you can choose any seven to send to the problem solvers. 
You and they have fifteen(15) minutes in which to solve seven(?). 
You may of you desire send any messages that you desire to them at 
any time---wi th or ui thout a problem. Problem solvers may also send 
messages to you. The book you have been given contains the 100 
possible problems. It is important that you try to get the 7 problems done 
in the 15 minutes. 
problems 1- 35 small difficulty 
problems 36-70 medium difficulty 
problems 71-100 extreme difficulty 
You send send any problems or messages you desire. 
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OBSERVER 
As an Observer you are to record for each problemg 
1. the numerical difficulty rating for each problem 
chosen 
2. the verbal description of the problem's difficulty 
(i.e., easy, medium, or extreme difficulty) 
3. whether it was correctly answered by the problem-
solver 
4. all written messages between the selector and the 
problem-solver -- recording them by name of writer 
and arranged in the order they were originally sent. 
Please use the attached sheets to record this information. 
Later on you will be asked to complete a questionnaire based upon 
this information. 
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Problem if -------- Difficulr.:y: 1,2,3,4,5,6, or 7 rutmerical designation 
verbal designation 
(easy, medium, extreme) 
Please record all written interchanges below. 
APPENDIX J 
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Table 27 
Summary, Table Analysis of Variance 
Repeated Measures on Causal Loci 
Source ss DF MS F :e Between 
Relation 1202.773 1 1202e773 00907 
Action 1015.61.5 1 101.5.615 Oa766 
Involvement 1840131 1 1840131 Oo1J9 
Complexity 20.787 1 200787 00016 
RxA 700464 1 700464 Oo05J 
Rx I 932.4.58 1 932.4.58 0.073 
Ax I 17040184 1 1704.,184 1028.5 
RX C 29.5.410 1 2950410 0.223 
A X C 349.04.5 1 349.045 00263 
IxC .5740389 1 .5740.389 o.4JJ 
RxAxI .562.50897 1 .56250897 40242 o0Lt4 
RxAxC 484.620 1 4840620 Oo.365 
RX IX C 1466081.5 1 1466e815 10106 
AxixC 14669.618 1 146690618 11.060 0001 
RxAxixC 1739.546 1 1739.546 io.312 
Error a0907.075 61 1326.346 
Within 
Causal Loci 4Yn5.ooo 4 1086807.50 150384 0001 
CL x Relation 2604.203 4 651.0.51 00922 
CL X Action 6180.631 4 1.54.501.58 20187 
CL x Involvement 52.50176 4 131.294 00186 
CL x Complexity 1448.438 4 362.109 0.513 
CLxRxA 13701 • .589 4 3425.398 4.849 .001 
CLxRxI 4850963 4 121.491 00172 
CLxAxI 4592.189 4 1148.047 10625 
CLxRxC 17420168 4 4350.542 Oo617 
CLxAxC 18010299 4 4.50.32.5 Oo637 
CLxixC 23280512 4 .5820128 Oo824 
CLxRxAxI 51800990 4 1295.248 1~833 
CLxRxAxC 141041+7 4 35.362 0(>050 
CLxRxixC 6481e877 4 16200469 2,294 
CLxAxixC 61_5lh625 4 15J8o656 20178 
CI.otBxAxixO - 712.205 4 170.051 00252 
Error 1723830805 244 7060491 
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Table 28 
Summary Table Ana.lys:i.s of Variance 
Internal-External Attribution Sea.le 
Source ss DF MS F J2 Relation 220390 1 220390 70099 301 
Action .30281 1 10041 L,041 
Involvement 0.619 1 0.619 OG196 
Complexity 0.160 1 00160 00051 
RxA ,58.40J 1 ,58o40J 18.519 0001 
Rx I 0.249 1 0.249 0.079 
Ax I 90448 1 9e448 24!1996 
IX C 0.508 1 011508 00161 
Rx C 20849 1 20849 Oo90J 
Ax C 0.716 1 00716 00227 
RxAxI 1.77.3 1 10773 0.562 
RxAxC 2.190 1 20190 Oa695 
RxixC 12 • .559 1 12.559 Jo98J 005 
AxixC 16.313 1 16a313 5o1'73 0026 
RxAxixC 0.675 1 Oo675 011214 
Error 192.371 61 3.1.54 
Table 29 
Summary Table Analysis of Variance 
Personality 
Source ss DF MS F J2 Relation 598.216 1 .598.216 o.814 
Action 1«5140899 1 1614e899 2.197 
Involvement 144.245 1 1440245 Ooi96 
Complexity 357.773 1 J57e77J 0"487 
RxA 39690437 1, 3969.4.37 .5.401 o02J 
RX I 90311 1 90311 011012 
Ax I 1680039 1 168.039 0.229 
Rx C 315.476 1 315.476 o.429 
A·x C Oo659 1 Oo659 0.001 
IX C 3.34.751 1 .334.751 o.4,56 
RxAxI 2271.447 1 2271.447 Jo091 
RxAxC 60.694 1 600694 0.083 
RxixC 51600415 1 5160.415 7.022 001 
AxixC 5140.877 1 51400877 6.995 001 
RxAxixC 202.637 1 2020637 00276 
Er-ror 44831.419 61 734.941 
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Table JO 
Summry Ta.ble Analysis o:f Variance 
Circumstances 
Source ss DF MS F :e Relation 228.085 1 228.085 00339 
Action 4262.969 1 4262.969 6.349 0014 
Involvement 43 • .580 1 430,580 00065 
Comp1ex1ty 451.662 1 451.662 0.673 
RxA 41340683 1 4134.683 601.58 0016 
Rxl 390281 1 39.281 00059 
AxI 4920519 1 492.519 00734 
RxC 322.148 1 322.148 o.479 
AxC 460402 1 460402 bo069 
IxC 26.434 1 26.434 0.039 
RxAxI 20,567 1 200567 Oo0J1 
RxAxC 51.953 1 510953 00077 
RxixC 4.710 1 4.770 0.007 
AxixC 90379 1 90379 0.014 
RxAxixC 13050975 1 1305.975 1.945 
Error 409560393 61 6710416 
Ta.ble 31 
Summary Table Analysis of Variance 
Mood 
Source ss DF MS F l! 
Relation 3.798 1 30798 00005 
Action 10680370 1 10680370 10274 
Involvement 2020672 1 202.672 Oe242 
Complexity 3980619 1 3980619 0,..475 
RxA 1215.481 1 12150481 1 .. 449 
Rx I 646.298 1 646.298 0.771 
AxI 5327.255 1 5327.255 60352 .014 
Rx C 451.662 1 4.510662 0 • .5:39 
Axe .581092.5 1 .5810925 o.694 
IxC 1797.719 1 17970719 20144 
RxAxI 8153.959 1 81.53.959 90723 0003 
RxAxC 264.168 1 264.168 0.315 
RxixC 98.5.899 1 98.50899 1.176 
RxAxlxC 0.099 1 0.099 0.000 
Error 51156.681 61 8380634 
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Table :32 
Summary '!able Analysis of Variance 
Motivation 
Source ss DF MS F l2 Relation 1770954 1 1770934 0.159 
Action 4.797 1 40797 0.004 
Involvement 370064 1 37.064 0.033 
Complexity 1.3.234 1 130234 0.012 
RxA 1419.694 1 1419.694 1~276 
RxI 600772 1 60.772 Oe0,5,5 
AxI 268.81.5 1 268.815 0.242 
Rx C 127.3.54 1 12703.54 0.11.5 
AX C 1032.676 1 1032.676 0.928 
IxC 666.268 1 666.268 0.599 
RxAxI 297.113 1 297.113 0.267 
RxAxO .5 • .586 1 So.586 0.005 
RxixC 382.238 1 ,382.238 o.JL,4 
AxixC 6117.7.53 1 6117.7.53 5.49s 0022 
RxAxixC 6,54.187 1 6,54.187 o.,588 
Error 67878.71.5 1 1112.766 
Ta.ble 33 
Summary Ta.ble Analysis of Variance 
other Persons 
Source ss DF MS F :e 
Relation 2798.944 1 2798.944 3.523 
Action 24,5.214 1 24,5.214 0.309 
Involvement 281,748 1 281.748 0,355 
Complexity 247.934 1 2470934 0.312 
RxA 3032.759 1 3032.759 3,,817 
Rxl 662.759 1 662.7.59 o.s.34 
Ax I 39.748 1 39.748 0.0.50 
Rx C 820.937 1 820.937 1.033 
Ax C 488.682 1 488.682 0.61.5 
IxC 77.731 1 77.731 0.090 
RxAxI 63.799 1 63.799 o.oao 
RxAxC 243.666 1 243.666 00307 
RxixC 216.5.267 1 216,5.267 2072.5 
AxixC a.570.332 1 8,5700332 10e786 .003 
RxAxixC 28808.54 1 288.8,54 Oa364 
Error 48467.678 61 794 • .552 
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Table 34 
Summary Ta.ble Analysis of Variance 
Communication: Quantity 
Source ss DF MS F J2 Relation 18.362 1 18.362 2,.,743 
Action 1.012 1 1.012 0.151 
Involvement o.814 1 00814 0,,122 
Complexity 0.001 1 0.001 01)000 
RxA J.808 1 J.808 0.569 
Rx I 0.334 1 0.334 0.049 
AX I 0.00.5 1 0.00.5 0.001 
Rx C 36.538 1 36.5.38 5.458 0023 
A x C .5.360 1 .5.360 o.ao1 
Ix C 8.4,34 1 s.434 1,259 
RxAxI 7.0.58 1 7.058 1a0_54 
RxAxC 0.665 1 0.66.5 0.099 
RX IX C 2.937 1 209.37 Oo439 
AX IX C 2.13.5 1 2.135 OoJ19 
RxAxixC 3.313 1 3.313 0.495 
Error 408.,388 61 6.69.5 
Table 3.5 
) 
Summary Ta.ble Analysis of Variance 
Communication: Negative Reinforcement-Person 
Source ss DF MS F l2 
Relation 0.992 1 0.992 1.801 
Action 7 • .512 1 7.512 13.633 0001 
Involvement 1.146 1 1.146 2.079 
Complexity 0 • .542 1 0.542 0.984 
RxA 0.621 1 Oo621 10128 
RxI 0.279 1 00279 0.057 
Ax I 1.6J4 1 1.6,34 2096.5 
R X C o.ooa 1 00008 00015 
Ax C 0.279 1 0.279 0.507 
Ix C 0.621 1 0.621 1a128 
RxAxI 0 • .542 1 0 • .542 0.984 
RxAxC 0.014 1 0.014 Oo02,5 
RxixC 0.0.52 1 Oo0.52 0;)09.5 
RxixC 0.0.52 1 0.052 00095 
AxixC 0.992 1 0.992 10801 
RxAxixC 0.000 1 OeOOO OeOOO 
Error 33.612 61 0 • .5.51 
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Table J6 
Summary Table Analysis of Variance 
/ 
Communication: Negative Reinforcement--Circumstances 
Source ss DF MS F J2 Relation 0.776 1 0.776 0.679 
Action 70197 1 7.197 60297 0015 
Involvement o.1Jr5:3 1 Oo4.53 0.397 
Complexity 0.l~53 1 o.453 OoJ96 
RxA 00008 1 00008 0.007 
Rx I 1.866 1 1.866 1.633 
AX I 0.014 1 0.014 0.012 
Rx C 4.239 1 4.239 3.709 
AX C 0.659 1 Oo6.59 0.577 
IX C 00776 1 0.776 03679 
RxAxI 0.659 1 0.6.59 0.577 
RxAxC 4.829 1 4.829 4.226 0044 
RxixC 2.L}77 1 20477 2.168 
AxixC 0.36.5 i 0.36.5 0~319 
RxAxixC 1.682 1 10682 1.472 
Error 69,714 n 61 1.143 
Table 37 
Summary Table Analysis of Variance 
Communications Positive Reinforcement--Person 
Source 'ss DF MS F 1l Relation 0 • .50.5 1 0 • .50.5 0.519 
Action 18.161 1 18.161 18,703 .,001 
Involvement 0.270 1 00270 0.278 
Comple:r..i ty 00087 1 0.087 OQ089 
RxA 1,471 1 1-,471 1t>514 
Rx I 7,492 1 70492 71a71.5 .007 
AX I 0.024 1 00024 Oo02.5 
Rx C 3.309 1 3.309 3$407 
AX C 4.179 1 4.179 4ca303 0042 
IX C 0.030 1 00030 00031 
RxAxI 2.824 1 2e824 2.908 
RxAxC 00011 1 Ou011 Oei011 
RxixC 3.122 1 3 .. 122 3a21.5 
AxixC 0.000 1 0 ... 000 0.,000 
RxAxixC 7.025 1 70025 7.23.5 0009 
Error .59.233 61 0.971 
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Table 38 
Summary Table Analysis of Va.ria.nce 
Communication: Positive Reinf'orcement-Circumsta.nceS' 
Source ss DF MS F J2 
Relation 0.082- 1 0.082 00231 
Action 0,958 1 0.9.58 2.712 
Involvement 0.677 1 0.677 1e91? 
Complexity 1.449 1 1.449 4.10:, 0047 
RxA 00139 1 0.139 0~393 
RX I 0.542 1 Oo,542 1 • .534 
AxI 0.1.52 1 00152 0.430 
RxC 0.072 1 0.072 OGl204 
Ax C 1.249 1 1.249 303.54 
Ix C 0,114 1 00114 0.323 
RxAxI 0.017 1 00017 0o048 
RxAxC 0.735 1 0.73.5 20082 
RxixC 0.357 1 0.357 1.011 I AxixC 0,891 1 0.091 2 • .523 
RxAxixC 1.063 1 1.063 3.007 
Error 21.550 61 00353 
'!able 39 
Summary Table Analysis of Va.ria.nce 
Communication: Adoption-=.Person 
Source ss DF MS F ,;e 
Relation 0,.581 1 0.581 1,218 
Action 00052 1 0.052 0.109 
Involvement 0.002 1 Oe002 0.005 
Complexity 0.097 1 00097 00204 
RxA 0,,581 1 0-,,581 10218 
Rx I 4.614 1 4.614 9,,676 ,oo3 
Ax I 0.255 1 0.2.55 00535 
Rx C 3.979 1 3.979 a.343 .,00.5 
Ax C 0.030 1 0.030 0.063 
IxC 0.030 1 0.,030 01t063 
RxAxI 0.235 1 0.23.5 0.493 
RxAxC 0.015 1 0.01.5 011032 
RxixC 1.423 1 1.423 2e984 
AxixC 0.097 1 0.097 0$204 
RxAxixC 0.069 1 0.069 0111144 
Error 29.091 61 o.477 
1.50 
Table 40 
Summary Table Analysis of Variance 
Communication: Adoption--Circumsta.nces 
Source ss DF MS F l2 
Relation 1.618 1 10618 2.309 
Action 0.068 1 00068 00096 
Involvement 0.173 1 00173 00247 
Complexity Oo047 1 00047 00068 
RxA 0.491 1 Oo491 'Oo699 
Rx I 6.701 1 6.701 9o.562 oOOJ 
AX I 0.008 1 00008 0.011 
RX C 0.529 1 Oo.529 0.75.5 
AxC 0.167 1 0.167 0.238 
IxC 0.071 1 0.071 00102 
RxAxI 0.228 1 00228 0.326 
RxAxC 0.132 1 0_132 0~1a9 
RxixC 0.529 1 Oo.529 0a755 
AxixC 0.569 1 0.569 Oo81J 
RxAxixC 0.024 1 0.024 0.0.3.5 
Error 420748 61 0.701 
